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DISCONTINUING TREATMENT OF COMATOSE
PATIENTS WHO HAVE NOT EXECUTED
LIVING WILLS
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the 1976 New Jersey Supreme Court decision, In re Quinlan,'
many courts have faced life and death decisions involving people who are
not legally brain dead,2 but are in irreversible vegetative comas. a These
courts have been asked to decide whether life-supporting medical treat-
ment should be discontinued once such a coma has been diagnosed and
further treatment has become futile. Although the courts have indicated
that the legislature is the proper branch of government to set guidelines
in this area,4 the courts have been compelled to hear these cases because
of legislative inaction.
Most courts have tried to determine what the patient would want if
he or she were competent to make the life or death decision.5 These
courts recognized the right of the patient to refuse medical treatment.6
Many legislatures have also recognized this right by enacting Natural
Death Acts.7 These statutory schemes allow patients to decide whether
1. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
2. See infra notes 9-14 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
4. See, eg., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
488-89 (1983); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 382-83, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276,
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334,
1346 (Del. 1980); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980).
5. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. See also Superintendent of
Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 750-52, 370 N.E.2d 417, 430-31 (1977), discussed
infra note 27.
6. This right has been found in both the common law, Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1015,
195 Cal. Rptr. at 489, and the constitutional right to privacy. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d
at 663. See infra text accompanying notes 20-26 for discussion.
7. California was the first state to enact a Natural Death Act in 1976. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE §§ 7185 to 7195 (West Supp. 1985), discussed infra at notes 144-58 and accom-
panying text. Since then, 16 other states and the District of Columbia have passed Natural
Death Acts. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to 22-8A-10 (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3801 to 82-
3804 (Supp. 1983); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 §§ 2501 to 2508 (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-
2421 to 6-2430 (Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to 39-4508 (Supp. 1984); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110-1/2 1 701 to 710 (Supp. 1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-18,101 to 65-28,109
(1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1 to 40:1299.58.10 (West Supp. 1985); NEv. REV.
STAT. §§ 449.540 to 449.690 (1981); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-2 TO 24-7-10 (SuPP. 1984);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-322 (1981 & Supp. 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to
97.090 (1983); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h §§ I to 11 (Vernon Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18 §§ 5251 to 5262 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE §§ 54-325.8:1 to 54-325.8:12 (Supp. 1984);
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or not to refuse treatment before their condition deteriorates to the point
where further treatment may be futile.
This Comment discusses the attempts that have been made to pro-
vide practical solutions to the problem of withdrawing treatment from
patients in irreversible vegetative comas.' It also discusses the limita-
tions inherent in most of these solutions, both the judicial and statutory
law. Finally, it discusses the North Carolina Natural Death Act, the
most comprehensive statute to date, and advocates that similar statutes
be enacted by each state.
A. Brain Death
A diagnosis of brain death is a declaration that the person is legally
dead. The Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School has
adopted a variety of standards to determine when brain death has oc-
curred. These include: absence of response to pain or other stimuli; ab-
sence of pupilary reflexes; absence of corneal, pharyngeal and other
reflexes; absence of blood pressure; absence of spontaneous respiration;
and an isoelectric ("flat") electroencephalogram. 9 These tests must be
repeated at least twenty-four hours after the first readings with no change
before the patient may be declared brain dead.10
Kansas adopted the first brain death statute in 1970.11 Since then,
thirty-four other states and the District of Columbia have adopted stat-
utes defining brain death." Generally, these statutes fall into three cate-
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010 to 70.122.905 (Supp. 1985); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1
to 16-30-10 (Supp. 1984).
8. A similar problem is presented by patients with terminal illnesses who are mentally
incompetent and thereby cannot make such decisions for themselves. This Comment takes no
position on dealing with these patients. However, because many of the legal principles in.
volved in dealing with mentally incompetent patients are the same as the principles of dealing
with patients in irreversible vegetative comas, cases dealing with both types of patients will be
cited.
Additionally, the North Carolina Natural Death Act, discussed infra at notes 166-202
and accompanying text, includes a provision covering mentally incompetent patients with ter-
minal illnesses. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a) (1981). This statute could be easily modified to
exclude such a provision. See infra note 168.
9. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 27, 355 A.2d 647, 656 (citing A Definition of Irreversible
Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337, 339 (1968)), cert denied 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
10. Id. (citing A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.A.M.A. 337, 339 (1968)).
11. D.W. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING § 4:7 (1981).
The original Kansas statute, § 77-202, was repealed in 1984 and replaced by KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 77-205.
12. These statutes are: ALA. CODE § 22-31-1 (Supp. 1981); ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.120
(1983); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-537 to 82-538 (Supp. 1983); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7180 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REv. STAT. § 12-36-136 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 19A-278(b) (Rev. 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2401 (Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. § 382.085
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gories: (1) those which provide two alternate definitions of death, one
based on respiratory and cardiac functions and the other based on the
absence of brain function; (2) those which allow absence of brain func-
tion as a definition of death where physical signs cannot be determined
because they are being artificially maintained; and (3) those which re-
quire total, irreversible cessation of brain function, with no mention of
the traditional, physical methods of determining death.13 The California
statute falls into the first category, and provides that: "An individual
who has sustained either (1) irreversible cessation of circulatory and re-
spiratory functions, or (2) irreversible cessation of all functions of the
entire brain, including the brain stem, is dead. A determination of death
must be made in accordance with accepted medical standards." 14
B. Irreversible Vegetative Coma
In contrast to brain death, an irreversible vegative coma (also
known as a chronic persistent vegetative state) has been defined as a con-
dition in which the patient remains capable of" 'maintain[ing] the vege-
tative parts of neurological function but who . . . no longer has any
cognitive function.' "15 Since the vegetative portion of the brain, which
controls the automatic functions such as heart rate and breathing, con-
tinues to live, the patient is not brain dead. However, the cognitive por-
tion of the brain, which controls the higher functions such as speech and
(Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-10-16 (1985); HAWAII REv. STAT. § 327C-I(b) (Supp.
1984); IDAHO CODE § 54-1819 (Supp. 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110-1/2 % 302 (1983); IOWA
CODE § 702.8 (1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 77-205 (1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:111 (West
Supp. 1985); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2811 to 2813 (Supp. 1984); MD. PUB. HEALTH
CODE ANN. § 5-202 (Supp. 1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.1021 (vest 1980); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-36-3 (1981); Mo. REv. STAT. § 194.005 (Supp. 1984); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-22-101 (1983); NEv. REv. STAT. § 451.007 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-4 (1978);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-323 (1981); OHIO Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2108.30 (Page Supp. 1984); OR.
REV. STAT. § 146.001 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35 § 10201 to 10203 (Purdon Supp. 1984);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 234-16 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-460 (Law. Co-op. 1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-3-501 (1983); TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 4447t §§ 1 to 3 (Vernon Supp.
1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 5218 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 54-325.7 (1982); W. VA.
CODE § 16-10-2 (Supp. 1984); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 146.71 (West Supp. 1984); WYO. STAT.
§ 35-19-101 (Supp. 1985).
13. D.W. MEYERS, supra note 11, at § 4:7.
14. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7180 (West Supp. 1985). As originally enacted in
1974, the California statute fell into the third category. D.W. MEYERS, supra note 11, at § 4:7.
In 1982, however, the California Legislature repealed that statute and passed the current ver-
sion, which is consistent with the Uniform Brain Death Act, 12 U.L.A. 187 (Supp. 1981).
D.W. MEYERS, MEDICO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING § 4:7 (Supp. 1984).
15. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 24, 355 A.2d 647, 654 (quoting the testimony of Dr. Fred
Plum, one of the expert witnesses), cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
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sight, is dead.16 The patient thus continues to "live," but loses all con-
tact with the outside environment. 7
In dealing with patients in irreversible vegetative comas, there are
two ways treatment can be discontinued-it may be withdrawn or it may
be withheld. Withdrawing treatment occurs when the patient is removed
from life-support apparatus to which he or she is already attached.'
Treatment is withheld, however, when the patient is not attached to any
additional apparatus, or when additional forms of treatment are simply
foregone. Such a case frequently arises from "Do Not Resuscitate"
(DNR) codes (also called "no-code" or "no code blue" orders). DNR
codes are placed on a patient's chart to indicate that no effort to resusci-
tate the patient should be made in the event of cardiac or respiratory
arrest. 19 Whether withdrawing or withholding treatment is contem-
plated, the problem arises as to who should make the decision. This
problem led to the use of the substituted judgment model.
II. SUBSTITUTED JUDGMENT MODEL
The common law right to refuse medical treatment is well estab-
lished. "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body .... ,,20 The only case
to rely on this common law principle in the context of patients in irre-
versible vegetative comas, however, is Barber v. Superior Court.
2
1
"[W]here a doctor performs treatment in the absence of an informed con-
sent, there is an actionable battery. The obvious corollary to this princi-
16. Id., 355 A.2d at 654. See also Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d
1334, 1337 (Del. 1980).
17. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,492 (1983).
See also Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 24, 355 A.2d at 654-55; Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 443-44,
426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 529 (1980), modified sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64,
438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); Severns, 421 A.2d at 1336-37; In re Din-
nerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 467, 380 N.E.2d 134, 135 (1978).
18. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (patient attached to a respirator,
which father, as guardian, sought to remove), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (family sought to remove
nasogastric tube attached to patient).
19. See, eg., Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (family of patient in
irreversible vegetative coma sought to place DNR code on patient's chart). Only Massachu-
setts has treated withdrawing treatment differently from withholding treatment. Massachu-
setts requires court permission to withdraw treatment, Superintendent of Belchertown v.
Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977), but not to withhold treatment. Dinnerstein,
6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978). See infra note 41 for a discussion of these cases.
20. Schloendorf v. Society of New York Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914), quoted with approval in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
21. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1015, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 489 (1983).
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ple is that a competent adult patient has the legal right to refuse medical
treatment.,
22
All other cases have decided this issue on the basis of the constitu-
tional right to privacy. 2 This right, of course, must be balanced against
the interest of the state in preserving life.24 However, the state's interest
weakens as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis for
full recovery dims.25 With respect to a patient in an irreversible vegeta-
tive coma with no chance of recovery, the state's interest is secondary to
the individual's right to privacy.
26
A person in a coma obviously cannot assert his or her own rights.
Courts that have addressed the problem of patients in irreversible vegeta-
tive comas have developed an analysis commonly referred to as the sub-
stituted judgment model.2 7 Under this model, a surrogate for the patient
makes the actual decision as to the cessation or continuation of treat-
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Leach v. Akron General Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 8-9, 426 N.E.2d
809, 814 (1980) ("Each court that has been faced with the question [of withdrawing treatment]
has used the same constitutional right to privacy as the legal basis for its decision."); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 ("[T]he unwritten constitutional right of privacy
... exist[s] in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights... ." (citing Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965))), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). "Presumably
this right is broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment under
certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision to terminate pregnancy under certain conditions." Id., 355 A.2d at 663 (citing Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)).
24. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
25. Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
26. Id. See also Leach, 68 Ohio Misc. at 9-10, 426 N.E.2d at 814-15; Superintendent of
BeIchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-41, 370 N.E.2d 417, 424-25 (1977); In re Col-
yer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 119-21, 660 P.2d 738, 741-42 (1983), subsequently modified on other
grounds, In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
27. See, e.g., Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 750-52, 370 N.E.2d at 431. The first use of the
substituted judgment model was in 1816 in England, and involved the administration of an
incompetent person's estate. Exparte Whitbread, 35 Eng. Rep. 878 (1816). In that case, the
court acted as a substitute for an incompetent person in order to validate a gift from the
incompetent's estate to a person to whom the incompetent owed no duty of support. The
court, as surrogate, authorized the gift, based on the motives and considerations that the court
believed would have motivated the incompetent.
The United States Supreme Court approved use of the substituted judgment model in City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. McGowan, 323 U.S. 594, 599 (1945) ("[The court is to substitute
itself as nearly as may be for the incompetent, and to act upon the same motives and considera-
tions as would have moved her," and any action taken by the court "is, in legal effect, her act
and the motive is hers."). More recently, the model has been used to approve removal of a
kidney from an incompetent to transplant to the incompetent's brother. Strunk v. Strunk, 445
S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). Of all the family members, only the incompetent was com-
patible as a donor. Id. at 146. The court decided that based on the close relationship, and the
benefit the incompetent would derive from his brother's continued life, the incompetent would
have approved the transplant. Id. at 146, 149.
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ment, guided by the preference of the patient, if known or ascertain-
able.28 Use of a surrogate assures that the patient's right to privacy will
not be destroyed.29 The courts have used two basic variations of the sub-
stituted judgment model to make their decisions.
A. The Guardian as the Surrogate
The first variation of the model requires the court to appoint a
guardian who is allowed to act as the surrogate and decide whether or
not to withdraw treatment. The court limits its involvement to evaluat-
ing the qualifications of the prospective guardian. The leading case using
this procedure is In re Quinlan.3 °
In Quinlan, the father of a patient in an irreversible vegetative coma
sought appointment as her guardian so that he could "authorize the dis-
continuance of all extraordinary medical procedures."31 The court held
that the character and motivations of the prospective guardian should be
28. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983)
(citing Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 750-52, 370 N.E.2d at 431).
A recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985), interpreted the substituted judgment model as containing three separate tests. Id,
at 360-67, 486 A.2d at 1229-32. Under any of these tests, if the patient has expressed a desire
to have treatment continued, regardless of the circumstances, treatment should never be with-
drawn or withheld. Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232.
The first test is the subjective test. Id. at 360-61, 486 A.2d at 1229. This test is used when
the patient has expressed a strong desire to have life-prolonging treatment withheld or with-
drawn if the situation ever arose. Casual remarks should not be taken into account. Id. at
360-64, 486 A.2d at 1229-31.
The second test is the limited-objective test. Id. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232. Under this test
the net benefit to the patient from continued treatment should be examined, along with any
indications (even casual remarks) that the patient would want treatment discontinued. As the
benefit decreases and the patient's prior expression to have treatment discontinued increases,
the surrogate should give greater weight to the option of discontinuing treatment. Id. at 365-
66, 486 A.2d at 1232.
The last test is the pure objective test. Id. at 366, 486 A.2d at 1232. This test should be
used when there has been no indication of the patient's preference. This test uses a high bur-
den, allowing treatment to be withdrawn or withheld only if there is virtually no benefit to the
patient. Id. at 366-67, 486 A.2d at 1232.
29. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 ("The only practical way to
prevent destruction of the right is to permit the guardian and family.., to render their best
judgment ... as to whether the [patient] would exercise it in these circumstances."), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Thus, the guardian may "vicariously assert the constitutional
right of a comatose ward to accept medical care or to refuse it." Severns v. Wilmington Medi-
cal Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1347 (Del. 1980). Accord In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405
N.E.2d 115 (1980) (family may assert rights of incompetent in court, but only the court may
make decision to withdraw treatment).
30. 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
31. Id. at 18, 355 A.2d at 651.
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evaluated in all respects.32 Absent a finding of unsuitability, the court
should appoint the father as guardian pursuant to the statutory prefer-
ence for the next of kin.3 3 The guardian could then assert any right of
the patient, including her right to refuse treatment.34 Finally, the court
held that the guardian did not have to obtain the court's permission in
order to withdraw treatment.35
32. One of the factors that impressed the court was the religious beliefs of the patient's
father, Joseph Quinlan. Id. at 30, 355 A.2d at 658. Although the court recognized that it is
unusual for religious dogma and concepts to enter into a civil trial, it held that they were
properly considered here as evidence of Mr. Quinlan's character, since these matters bore upon
his decision. Id. at 30, 355 A.2d at 658. The court emphasized that no religious views could
serve as precedent for future cases, but noted that any religious view, if it bears at all on the
guardian's beliefs and judgments, may be considered to the extent that it bears upon the guard-
ian's decision. Id. at 33-34, 355 A.2d at 660.
In the present case, since Mr. Quinlan was Catholic, the Catholic Church's point of view
on withdrawal of treatment could be considered. Id. at 30, 355 A.2d at 658. Pope Pius XII, in
a 1957 "allocutio" (address), stated that to the extent that the use of a respirator goes
"beyond the ordinary means to which one is bound, it cannot be held that there is an
obligation to use them or... to give the doctor permission to use them .... There is
not involved here a case of direct disposal of life of the patient; nor of euthanasia in
any way; this would never be licit. Even when it causes the arrest of circulation, the
interruption of attempts at resuscitation is never more than an indirect cause of the
cessation of life."
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 439 n.3, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 n.3 (1980) (quoting The
Prolongation of Life, Address of Pope Pius XII to an International Congress of Anesthesiolo-
gists, November 24, 1957 AAS XXXXIX (1957)), modified sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). The Church filed an
amicus brief in Quinlan which stated that "'the decision of Joseph Quinlan to request the dis-
continuance of this treatment is, according to the teachings of the Catholic Church, a morally
correct decision.'" Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 32, 355 A.2d at 659 (quoting the statement of Bishop
Lawrence B. Casey, as reproduced in the amicus brief) (emphasis in original). This statement
of position coincided with the advice that was given to Mr. Quinlan when he consulted with
his parish priest. Id. at 30, 355 A.2d at 658. The evidence also showed that had the Church's
viewpoint been to the contrary, Mr. Quinlan would not have sought to discontinue treatment
for his daughter. Id. The court indicated that this evidence demonstrated Mr. Quinlan's de-
sire to make a moral choice and his suitability to serve as guardian. Id. at 32, 355 A.2d at 660.
33. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 53, 355 A.2d at 670-71. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 3B:12-25 (1983)
(court should appoint as guardian the person's spouse, heirs, or any other proper person, in
that order). Implicit in this decision is that a prospective guardian's express intention to with-
draw treatment is not, by itself, sufficient to make a prospective guardian unsuitable.
34. Id. at 41-42, 355 A.2d at 664. See supra note 29.
35. Id. at 50-51, 355 A.2d at 669. See infra note 51 and accompanying text. The court
did, however, set out a procedure that must be followed in order to discontinue treatment. See
infra note 162.
Soon after the court's March 31, 1976 decision, treatment was withdrawn from Karen
Ann Quinlan. She continued to live until June 11, 1985, however, when she died of pneumo-
nia. L.A. Times, June 12, 1985, § 1, at 4, col. 1. Although the cases of Barber v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) and In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486
A.2d 1209 (1985), allowing withdrawal of nasogastric tubes, were decided during this time,
Ms. Quinlan's family never had such treatment withdrawn from her. Jacobs, Don't Pull Feed-
ing Tubes From Dying, State Advises, L.A. Times, June 28, 1985, § 1, at 1, 24, col. 1.
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B. The Court as the Surrogate
The second variation of the model requires the court to determine
whether or not to continue life-support treatment after a full hearing. In
effect, the court acts as the surrogate.36 This approach is exemplified by
the Massachusetts case, In re Spring.37 Spring involved an incompetent
patient suffering from end-stage kidney disease.38 The patient's son was
appointed guardian and, together with the patient's wife, requested that
life-prolonging treatment be discontinued.39 The Appeals Court of Mas-
sachusetts granted the wife and son, together with the attending physi-
cian, the power to make the decision to withdraw treatment.'4
The Massachusetts Supreme Court expressly rejected this proce-
dure, noting that "the ultimate decision making responsibility [should
not be shifted] away from the duly established courts of proper jurisdic-
tion."41 The court reasoned that private medical decisions must be made
36. This variation comes closer to the historical use of the substituted judgment model
than does the variation used in Quinlan. See supra note 27.
37. 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
38. Id. at 632, 405 N.E.2d at 118.
39. Id. at 631, 405 N.E.2d at 117.
40. Id., 405 N.E.2d at 118. The lower court used the first variation of the substituted
judgment model. Instead of appointing one surrogate, as the court in Quinlan had, the court
appointed three surrogates, all of whom needed to approve the final decision. 8 Mass. App. Ct.
831, 399 N.E.2d 493 (1979), rev'd 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
41. 380 Mass. at 636, 405 N.E.2d at 120. The court was faced with the apparently con-
flicting decisions of Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d
417 (1977), and In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978). In Sakewicz,
the court required that a guardian ad litem be appointed to oppose the person seeking to
withdraw treatment. The guardian was to conduct an investigation and to submit "all reason-
able arguments in favor of administering treatment to prolong the life of the individual in-
volved." 373 Mass. at 757, 370 N.E.2d at 433. The judge should then decide whether or not
to allow treatment to be withdrawn. Id., 370 N.E.2d at 434. The court specifically rejected
the Quinlan court's approach of allowing the guardian to make the decision. Id. at 758-59, 370
N.E.2d at 434-35.
In Dinnerstein, however, the court allowed the family and physician of a patient in an
irreversible vegetative coma to decide to withhold treatment and not to resuscitate the patient
in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest. 6 Mass. App. Ct. at 475-76, 380 N.E.2d at 139.
The court indicated that the Saikewicz decision did not intend to force resuscitation of a termi-
nally ill patient during natural death. Id. at 471, 380 N.E.2d at 137. "[S]ince it is obvious on
reflection that cardiac or respiratory arrest will signal the arrival of death for the overwhelm-
ing majority of persons whose lives are terminated by illness or old age," id. at 470, 380 N.E.2d
at 136, a strict reading of Saikewicz "would require attempts to resuscitate dying patients in
most cases, without exercise of medical judgment, even when that course of action could aptly
be characterized as a pointless, even cruel, prolongation of the act of dying." Id. at 471, 380
N.E.2d 137 (footnote omitted).
The Spring court, while not specifically approving the Dinnerstein decision in its entirety,
did agree that the result was consistent with Saikewicz. 380 Mass. at 635, 405 N.E.2d at 120.
The court reaffirmed the procedure outlined in Saikewicz, requiring the use of a guardian ad
litem in all cases involving the withdrawal of treatment. Id. In addition to the findings of the
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responsibly, subject to judicial scrutiny in order to insure that good faith
and due care are observed.42 Accordingly, this variation of the substi-
tuted judgment model requires the court, as surrogate, to determine what
the patient would have decided if he or she were capable of making the
decision.43 The court should achieve a balance between the putative
desires of the ward and the possible countervailing state interests.'
The use of the judiciary under either of these variations, however,
has a number of drawbacks. Chief among these is that it is "impossibly
cumbersome."45 Court proceedings consume such a tremendous amount
of time, including the inevitable appeals,46 that the patient often dies
before final judicial resolution.47 Next, the financial burden placed on
the patient's family by legal expenses, added to the expenditures for med-
ical care, can overwhelm the typical family budget. Thirdly, "[t]he
methodology and the techniques from our classic adversary system are
not best suited to the resolution of the issues presented."48 Fourthly,
there is evidence that for many years patients' families and physicians
guardian, the court could also consider the findings of medical ethics committees, the testi-
mony of the attending physician, and the testimony of other medical experts. Id. Accord-
ingly, in Massachusetts, treatment may be withheld without prior court approval, but cannot
be withdrawn unless such approval is received.
42. 380 Mass. at 639, 405 N.E.2d at 122.
43. Id. at 640, 405 N.E.2d at 122. See also Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc.,
421 A.2d 1334, 1349-50 (Del. 1980) (the problems presented are factual in a very significant
way and require resolution of a number of questions about what constitutes a life-sustaining
system in each case).
44. 380 Mass. at 640-41, 405 N.E.2d at 123.
45. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 50, 355 A.2d 647, 669, cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
46. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277 (Jones, J.,
dissenting in part) ("The lapse of time consumed in appellate review before there can be final
judicial determination will almost always be unacceptable and makes recourse to judicial pro-
ceedings impracticable."), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
47. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 341, 486 A.2d 1209, 1219 (1985); Bartling v.
Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 189, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221 (1984); Eichner v. Dillon,
73 A.D.2d 431,434, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 523 (1980), modified sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Storar, 52
N.Y.2d 363, 369 & n.1, 420 N.E.2d 64, 66 & n.1, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 268 & n.1, cert denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 631-32 n.1, 405 N.E.2d 115, 118 n.l (1980).
48. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277 (Jones, J.,
dissenting in part) ("The courts can claim no particular competence to reach the difficult ulti-
mate decision, depending as it must not only on medical data, but on theological tenets and
perceptions of human values which defy classification and calibration."), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 50, 355 A.2d 647, 669 (Court confirmation of these
decisions would be a "gratuitous encroachment on the medical profession's field of competence
.... [These decisions] should obviously include at some stage the feelings of the family...
[and thus] should be controlled primarily within the patient-doctor-family relationship.. .. "),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). The courts have also indicated that the legislature is the
proper branch of government to set guidelines in this area. See infra note 127.
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have made decisions to withdraw or withhold treatment, often after con-
sulting with religious counselors.49 Finally, the decision of the family is
usually followed by the courts anyway." Accordingly, most courts have
concluded that it is not necessary in all cases to obtain prior court ap-
proval in order to disconnect life-support apparatus from patients in irre-
versible vegetative comas.51
The only potential benefit to the use of the court system is that it
protects the person who actually disconnects the patient, usually the at-
tending physician, from civil or criminal liability.52 Any physician who
49. Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 385-86 & n.3, 420 N.E.2d at 75-76 & n.3, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 277-78
& n.3 (Jones, J., dissenting in part) (" '[Tihe austere American Medical Association [has] for-
mally adopted the following policy statement: "The cessation of the employment of extraordi-
nary means to prolong the life of the body where there is irrefutable evidence that biological
death is imminent is the decision of the patient and-or his immediate family . . . ." This
provided doctors with a sanction for what many had been doing for some time, since the
practice of turning off machines, for example, to allow death to come to a patient whom only
the machine is keeping alive is a fairly common practice for hospitals.'" (quoting Kutner,
Euthanasia: Due Process For Death With Dignity; The Living Will, 54 IND. L.J. 201, 223
(1979))). See also Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 33, 355 A.2d at 660 (Authorization of withdrawal of
treatment may merely require that courts "'recognize the present standards and practices of
many people engaged in medical care who have been doing what the parents of Karen Ann
Quinlan are requesting.'" (quoting position statement of Bishop Casey, spokesman for the
N.J. Catholic Conference)).
50. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (decision of father to withdraw life-
sustaining apparatus allowed), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629,
405 N.E.2d 115 (1980) (decision of wife and son to withdraw hemodialysis treatment ap-
proved); Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (petition of
husband to discontinue treatment granted); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d
517 (1980) (leader of religious order allowed to withdraw treatment from one of its members),
modified sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981); In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978)
(family and physician of patient allowed to withhold treatment via DNR code). But see In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266 (decision of mother to withdraw
treatment overruled), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
51. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 (1983)
("[W]e agree with those [courts] which have held that requiring judicial intervention in all
cases is unnecessary and may be unwise."); Storar, 52 N.Y.2d at 382-83, 420 N.E.2d at 74, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 276 ("Neither the common law nor existing statutes require persons generally to
seek prior court assessment .... "); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 127-28, 660 P.2d 738, 745-
46 (1983) ("[W]e choose a course similar to that in Quinlan and hold that judicial intervention
in every decision to withdraw life sustaining treatment is not required."), subsequently modi-
fied on other grounds, In re Guardianship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
But see In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 636, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120 (1980) ("Again we disapprove
shifting of the ultimate decision-making responsibility away from the duly established courts of
proper jurisdiction.").
52. See, e.g., Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1349 n.12 (Del.
1980) ("[A] criminal prosecution may be enjoined if it infringes upon some constitutional
right, provided that the party seeking such relief demonstrates that failure to enjoin will cause
irreperable harm." (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971))); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d
363, 382, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276 ("[R]esponsible parties who wish to com-
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is acting under the direction of the court, either directly or through a
court appointed guardian, cannot later be held liable for the decision if it
is challenged.53 It has been suggested that even without a court order, a
physician who acts on a good faith judgment that is not greviously unrea-
sonable by medical standards will at least be protected from criminal
liability. 4 Following accepted medical standards, 5  however, did not
ply with the law, in cases where the legal consequences of the contemplated action is uncertain,
need not act at their peril."), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). But see In re Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 52, 355 A.2d 647, 670 ("[E]xercise of a constitutional right... is protected from criminal
prosecution.... [Such protection] extends to third parties whose action is necessary to effectu-
ate the exercise of that right .... ." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
53. A physician might still be liable if(l) the original diagnosis of an irreversible vegetative
coma was made negligently, and it was upon this erroneous diagnosis that the court based its
decision to discontinue treatment, or (2) if the discontinuation was negligently carried out.
See, e.g., In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 639, 405 N.E.2d 115, 122 (1980) ("[C]ourt approval may
serve the useful purpose of resolving a doubtful or disputed question of law or fact, but it does
not eliminate all risk of liability.").
54. Id. at 637, 405 N.E.2d at 121 (citing Commonwealth v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 544,
359 N.E.2d 4, 28-29 (1976) (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting)).
55. The Los Angeles Bar Association, together with the Los Angeles Medical Society, has
developed the following guidelines for withdrawing treatment from a patient:
A. The general principles which should govern decision making are:
1. It is the right of a person capable of giving informed consent to make his or
her own decision regarding medical care after having been fully informed
about the benefits, risks and consequences of available treatment, even when
such a decision might foreseeably result in shortening the individual's life.
2. Persons who are unable to give informed consent have the same rights as do
persons who can give such consent. Decisions made on behalf of persons
who cannot give their own informed consent should, to the extent possible,
be the decisions which those persons would have made for themselves had
they been able to do so.... [T]he conservator of an adult patient[ ] must
consent to the decision. Family members of adult patients should always be
consulted, although they have no legal standing under present California
Law to make decisions on behalf of the patient.
3. A physician may discontinue use of a cardiopulmonary life-support system
(i.e. a mechanical respirator or ventilator), and is not required to continue
its use indefinitely solely because such support was initiated at an earlier
time.
B. Three sets of circumstances in which decisions to discontinue the use of cardi-
opulmonary life-support systems can be made without the necessity of prior ap-
proval by the courts are:
3. Irreversible Coma
Cardiopulmonary life-support systems may be discontinued if all of the fol-
lowing conditions are present:
a. The medical record contains a written diagnosis of irreversible coma,
confirmed by a physician who by training or experience is qualified to
assist in making such decisions. The medical record must include ade-
quate medical evidence to support the diagnosis;
b. The medical record indicates that there has been no expressed intention
on the part of the patient that life-support systems be initiated or main-
tained in such circumstance; and
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protect two physicians from prosecution in a recent California case.
III. PROPORTIONATE/DISPROPORTIONATE ANALYSIS
In Barber v. Superior Court,56 the California Court of Appeal held
that two physicians' omission to treat a patient in an irreversible vegeta-
tive coma was not a wrongful failure to perform a legal duty.17 Because
the court found that there was no legal duty to provide medical care, a
decision not to act could not lead to criminal liability. 8 Thus, even
though the physicians acted intentionally and with the knowledge that
the patient would die, their conduct did not amount to murder.5 9 The
court therefore issued a peremptory writ dismissing the murder charges
against the two physicians.'
A. Barber v. Superior Court
The facts of Barber are as follows:
On August 26, 1981, Dr. Neil Barber, an internist, and Dr. Robert
Nejdl, a surgeon, operated on Clarence Herbert. Following the success-
ful completion of the surgery, Mr. Herbert went into cardiorespiratory
arrest. Although he was quickly revived and placed on life-support
equipment, Mr. Herbert suffered severe brain damage that left him in an
irreversible vegetative coma.61  Three days later, after being fully in-
formed of the prognosis, Mr. Herbert's family authorized the removal of
all life-support equipment.62 As a result, either directly by or through
the orders of the doctors, the respirator and certain other life-support
c. The medical record indicates that the patient's family or guardian or
conservator concurs in the decision to discontinue such support.
D.A. ROBBINS, LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES IN CANCER CARE IN THE UNITED STATES, 11-
13 (1983). All of the conditions described above were met by the physicians in Barber v.
Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983). See infra notes 193-99 and
accompanying text. Although these guidelines only mention cardiopulmonary life-support ap-
paratus, other authorities have stated that it is also justifiable to withhold or withdraw artificial
nutrition and hydration supplied by a nasogastric tube, as was the case in Barber. Siegel,
Medical Quandary: Bioethics Seeks Rules for Dying, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1985, § 1, at 1, 30,
col. 2 (citing NEW ENG. J. MED. and HASTINGS CENTER REP.); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,
374, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236-37 (1985).
56. 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983).
57. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
58. Id. at 1017, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (citing I WITKIN, CAL. CRIMES § 67 (1963)).
59. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
60. Id. at 1010, 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486, 494.
61. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. This diagnosis was made by Drs. Bar-
ber and Nejdl, and was confirmed by two specialists, a cardiologist and a neurologist. Id. at
1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486; CHA INSIGHT Vol. 8, No. 13, p. 1, April 3, 1984.
62. The family sent a written request to the hospital that they wanted "'all machines
taken off that are sustaining life.'" 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. All
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equipment were removed. Mr. Herbert continued to breathe, however,
but showed no signs of improvement. 63 On August 31, the family re-
quested the removal of the nasogastric and intravenous tubes which had
been providing nourishment and hydration. These were removed, and
Mr. Herbert died on September 6, 1981.4
Acting on the report of a nurse,65 the Los Angeles County District
Attorney filed charges of murder and conspiracy to commit murder
against Drs. Barber and Nejdl. At the close of the preliminary hearing,
the municipal court magistrate dismissed all charges. A superior court
judge, on the motion of the district attorney, ordered the charges rein-
stated, and the two physicians filed for writs of prohibition. Subse-
quently, the court of appeal issued an alternate writ pending a full
hearing of the case.
6
In explaining its decision to issue the peremptory writ, the court of
appeal drew two important distinctions from existing case law. The
court first modified the test for determining when life-sustaining meas-
ures may be withdrawn or withheld.67 Secondly, the court eliminated
the differentiation between the various types of mechanical life-support
apparatus. 8
In the past, courts have characterized life-sustaining measures as be-
ing either "ordinary" or "extraordinary." In making its first distinction,
the Barber court noted that the use of the terms ordinary and extraordi-
nary to describe the medical procedures only "begs the question. "69
Although there may have been a duty to start life-support treatment at
some point, a physician has no duty to continue ineffective or futile treat-
ment,70 and may discontinue such treatment without fear of civil or
criminal liability.71 Treatment is futile when it cannot and does not im-
prove the prognosis for recovery.72 The court found that using the terms
"proportionate" and "disproportionate" better describes the balancing
decisions were made unanimously by Mr. Herbert's wife and eight of their children. Id. at
1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493; CHA INSIGHT, supra note 61, at 1.
63. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
64. Id. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486; CHA INSIGHT, supra note 61, at 1-2.
65. CHA INSIGHT, supra note 61, at 2.
66. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
67. Id. at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
68. Id. at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
69. Id. at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
70. Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
71. Id. at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491 (quoting Horan, Euthanasia and Brain Death: Ethi-
cal and Legal Considerations, 315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 363, 367 (1978)).
72. Id. (quoting Horan, Ethuanasia and Brain Death Ethical and Legal Considerations,
315 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 363, 367 (1978)).
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test of benefits gained versus burdens caused by life-sustaining equip-
ment.73 "[P]roportionate treatment is that which, in the view of the pa-
tient, has at least a reasonable chance of providing benefits to the patient,
which benefits outweigh the burdens attendant to the treatment." 74
The difference in a proportionate/disproportionate analysis is not in
its ultimate foCUS, 75 but in its approach. Whereas an ordinary/extraordi-
nary analysis examines the equipment being used, 76 a proportionate/dis-
proportionate analysis emphasizes the net benefit to the patient. Thus, a
treatment may be disproportionate if it has a small burden but an even
smaller benefit, or if it has a large benefit but an even larger burden.77
The following discussion exemplifies how a proportionate/disproportion-
ate analysis would be applied in various treatment situations.
The first type of treatment is one that is only minimally intrusive,
such as a blood transfusion. In the New York case of In re Storar,78 the
mother of an incompetent patient with terminal cancer sought to stop
blood transfusions since the cancer would kill the patient within six
months even with continued treatment. 79 The court decided that the
transfusions should have been continued.80 Although the treatment
73. Id. at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
[E]ven if a proposed course of treatment might be extremely painful or intrusive, it
would still be proportionate treatment if the prognosis was for complete cure or sig-
nificant improvement in the patient's condition. On the other hand, a treatment
course which is only minimally painful or intrusive may nonetheless be considered
disproportionate to the potential benefits if the prognosis is virtually hopeless for any
significant improvement in condition.
Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rtpr. at 491.
74. Id.
75. "'T]he focal point of the decision should be the prognosis as to the reasonable possi-
bility of return to cognitive and sapient life, as distinguished from the forced continuance of
... biological vegetative existence ....... Id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492 (quoting Quinlan, 70 N.J.
10, 50, 355 A.2d 647, 669, cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)). See also In re Dinnerstein, 6
Mass. App. Ct. 466, 472-73, 380 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1978) ("'Prolongation of life'.., does not
mean a mere suspension of the act of dying, but contemplates, at the very least, a remission of
symptoms enabling a return towards a normal, functioning, integrated existence.").
76. "'[O]ne would have to think that the use of the same respirator or like support could
be considered "ordinary" in the context of the possibly curable patient but "extraordinary" in
the context of the forced sustaining by cardio-respiratory processes of an irreversibly doomed
patient.'" 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491-92 (quoting Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 48,
355 A.2d at 668).
77. Id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
78. 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
79. Id. at 374, 420 N.E.2d at 69, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
80. Id. at 381-82, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275. The patient died while the case
was on appeal, even though treatment was continued. Id. at 369 & n.1, 420 N.E.2d at 66 &
n.1, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 268 & n.1. The court decided that, despite the mootness of the particular
controversy, the issues underlying the case were of public importance and had not previously
been discussed by the court. Id. at 369-70, 420 N.E.2d at 66-67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 268-69.
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could not cure the cancer, it would have maintained the patient's mental
and physical abilities "at the usual level" for that patient."' The treat-
ment generated great benefits which outweighed the small burden; thus,
the treatment was proportional.
In a case such as Barber, however, treatment by blood transfusion
would be disproportionate (assuming that transfusions were necessary in
addition to the other treatments). A transfusion would not return the
patient to anywhere near his "usual level," even coupled with the other
treatment. It would only maintain the patient's coma, and prolong the
process of death. The treatment would thus not provide any significant
improvement in condition. 2 Since there would be virtually no benefit to
a patient such as Mr. Herbert, the treatment would be disproportionate
despite its relatively small burden.
The second type of treatment is one that imposes a great burden on
the patient, such as chemotherapy. In the Massachusetts case of Super-
intendent ofBelchertown v. Saikewicz,83 the court dealt with an incompe-
tent patient suffering from leukemia.84 If treated with chemotherapy,
there was a thirty to forty percent chance of remission, but the remission
would last for only two to thirteen months, with no chance of a total
cure.85 The burden placed on the patient, however, would be extensive.
The toxic nature of the chemicals involved would have caused "'pain
and discomfort, depressed bone marrow, pronounced anemia, increased
chance of infection, possible bladder irritation, and possible loss of
hair.' "86 The court determined that the great burden placed on the pa-
tient outweighed the minimal benefit."s Accordingly, the treatment
could be discontinued as disproportionate.
If, on the other hand, there was a great benefit, such as a ninety
percent chance of full remission, then the treatment would be propor-
81. Id. at 381, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275 (emphasis added). It should be
noted that the quality of life determination is made with respect to the patient's pre-illness
condition. John Storar could never have had the same quality of life as an average person,
since he had never been, and never would be, competent. Id. at 380, 420 N.E.2d at 72, 438
N.Y.S.2d at 274-75. However, "a court should not... allow an incompetent patient to ...
[die] because someone, even someone as close as a parent or sibling, feels that this is best for
one with an incurable disease." Id. at 382, 420 N.E.2d at 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 275-76.
82. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
83. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
84. Id. at 729, 370 N.E.2d at 419.
85. Id. at 734, 370 N.E.2d at 421 (quoting the findings of the lower court). Both of Mr.
Saikewicz's attending physicians recommended against the chemotherapy. Id. at 730, 370
N.E.2d at 419.
86. Id. at 734, 370 N.E.2d at 421 (quoting the findings of the lower court).
87. Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d at 435.
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tionate. There would be an excellent chance of "significant improvement
in the patient's condition,"' 8 namely, a return to the patient's "usual
level" of mental and physical ability. 9 This great benefit would out-
weigh the large burden, making the treatment proportionate; therefore, it
could not be withdrawn.
The second distinction recognized by the Barber court was that
there is no rational difference between the use of mechanical breathing
devices such as respirators, and mechanical feeding devices such as intra-
venous tubes.90 The court emphasized that medical nutrition and hydra-
tion do not always provide a net benefit to the patient and are more
similar to other medical procedures than to typical human methods of
nutrition and hydration. 91 Thus, the benefits and burdens of such de-
vices "ought to be evaluated in the same manner as any other medical
procedure." 92
Once it has been determined that further treatment is useless, respi-
rators, medical nutrition and hydration, and similar procedures which do
not address the pathology, 93 become futile and merely prolong the act of
88. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
89. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 381, 420 N.E.2d 64, 73, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 275, cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
90. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. The court noted that the
distinction urged by the prosecutor was based "on the emotional symbolism of providing food
and water to those incapable of providing for themselves." Id. However, on closer examina-
tion, it is clear that medical nutrition and hydration provides aid which is no different in kind
than is provided by a machine such as a respirator, without which the patient cannot breathe.
Both procedures amount to forced sustainment of life by medical equipment. Id. at 1016-17,
195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Also, neither a respirator nor medical nutrition and hydration directly
cure or even address the pathological condition; they merely sustain the biological function
while other processes address the pathology. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
Despite this decision, a recent New Jersey decision, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985), and at least two reports by prominent physicians that artificial nutrition and
hydration and antibiotics could be withheld or withdrawn from patients in irreversible vegeta-
tive comas, Siegel, Medical Quandary: Bioethics Seeks Rules for Dying, L.A. Times, Jan. 6,
1985, § 1, at 1, 30, col. 2 (citing NEw ENG. J. MED. and HASTINGS CENTER REP.), the evi-
dence indicates that only 5% of all physicians would agree to withdraw nasogastric tubes, and
only 15% to 20% would withdraw antibiotics. Siegel, Medical Quandary: Bioethics Seeks
Rules for Dying, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1985, § 1, at 1, 30, col. 2 (citing estimates of Arthur
Caplan, a philosopher at the Hastings Center). Additionally, the California Department of
Aging has started recommending that nursing homes not withdraw nasogastric tubes from
unconscious dying patients despite the Barber decision. Jacobs, Don't Pull Feeding Tubes
From Dying, State Advises, L.A. Times, June 28, 1985, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
91. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
92. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. More recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reached a similar conclusion about medical nutrition and hydration. In re Conroy, 98 N.J.
321, 374, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236-37 (1985).
93. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. See supra note 90.
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dying. Therefore, they are disproportionate and may be discontinued.94
In Barber, the court concluded that the evidence showed that Mr. Her-
bert's condition had deteriorated to the point where continued treatment
no longer provided a net benefit to Mr. Herbert.95
A physician has no duty to continue treatment if further efforts
would be futile.96 Using the proportionate/disproportionate analysis, the
continued treatment of Mr. Herbert was clearly futile. According to the
experts who testified at the preliminary hearing, Mr. Herbert's chances
for unimpaired or full recovery were miniscule. 97 These opinions coin-
cided with the diagnosis of the four physicians who had examined Mr.
Herbert.9 8 Since there was virtually no chance that Mr. Herbert would
fully recover, the treatments being used (including the intravenous tubes)
served no further purpose. Therefore, they were disproportionate to the
burdens that they were causing, even though they carried fairly minor
burdens in absolute terms.
The court thus concluded that the physicians' conduct was not mur-
der.99 The court noted that "[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human
being, . .. with malice aforethought."' "°° Whereas the superior court
found that the physicians' conduct was unlawful as a matter of law since
it shortened Mr. Herbert's life,"°1 the appellate court determined that
their conduct was an omission, not an affirmative act.102 There can be no
94. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492. "Although there may be a
duty to provide life-sustaining machinery in the immediate aftermath of a cardio-respiratory
arrest, there is no duty to continue its use once it has become futile in the opinion of qualified
medical personnel." Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491 (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
96. Id. at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
97. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492. The most optimistic prognosis provided that Mr.
Herbert had an excellent chance of "recovery," but defined "recovery" as a spectrum running
from an irreversible vegetative coma to full recovery. This expert could not predict where on
this spectrum Mr. Herbert would end up, but the studies he relied upon indicated the chances
for full recovery were miniscule. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
100. Id. at 1011, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486 (emphasis in original) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 187 (West 1984)).
101. Id. at 1011-12, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
102. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. "[C]essation of'heroic' life support measures is not
an affirmative act but rather a withdrawal or omission of further treatment." Id. at 1016, 195
Cal. Rptr. at 490.
Even though these life support devices are, to a degree, "self-propelled," each pulsa-
tion of the respirator or each drop of fluid introduced into the patient's body by
intravenous feeding devices is comparable to a manually administered injection or
item of medication. Hence, "disconnecting" of the mechanical devices is comparable
to withholding the manually administered injection or medication,
id., 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490, and thus is equivalent to an omission, not an affirmative act.
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criminal liability from an omission to act unless there is a duty to act
which has been violated.103 Since the court found that the physicians
had no further duty to continue treatment under the proportionate/dis-
proportionate model, any omission on their part was not unlawful. 1o4
Lastly, the court addressed the question of who was the proper per-
son to act as surrogate and decide if treatment should be withdrawn.105
The court first noted that there is nothing in the California Natural
Death Act to indicate that the statutory procedure is the exclusive
method of discontinuing life-support treatment.106 The court then de-
cided that there should first be a diagnosis by the attending and consult-
ing physicians that further treatment would be useless.10 7 Then, if at all
possible, the patient should make the decision himself. °10 If, as in this
case, the patient is unable to make the decision, a surrogate should be
chosen. The surrogate should be guided by the wishes of the patient, if
ascertainable. If those desires are not ascertainable, the surrogate should
objectively consider the patient's best interests.109
103. Id. at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (citing 1 WrrKIN, CAL. CRIMES § 67 (1963)).
104. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
105. For all practical purposes, the Barber court adopted the Quinlan variation of the sub-
stituted judgment model. See infra notes 117-39 and accompanying text.
106. Id. at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7193 (West
Supp. 1985) provides in part: "Nothing in this chapter shall impair or supersede any legal
right or legal responsibility which any person may have to effect the withholding or with-
drawal of life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner." However, CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7195 (West Supp. 1985) provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be con-
strued to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliber-
ate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying as provided in
this chapter."
Although the court never discussed § 7195, inherent in its decision is that Mr. Herbert
died a "natural death," and so was not the victim of "mercy killing" such that § 7195 would be
invoked. The court specifically quoted the legislative findings contained in § 7186 that recog-
nize the futility of medical treatment in some cases, and the patient's fundamental right to
have such procedures withdrawn or withheld. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1015-16, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 489 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7186 (West 1984)). When the court
found that the procedures in Barber were futile and disproportionate, id. at 1020, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 492, it implicitly held that Mr. Herbert's fundamental right to have treatment with-
drawn under §§ 7186 and 7193 could be exercised. When the patient is unable to exercise this
right himself, a surrogate may exercise it for him. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. See
supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. For a more complete discussion of the California
Natural Death Act, see infra notes 144-59 and accompanying text.
107. 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492 ("Clearly, the medical diagnoses and
prognoses must be determined by the treating and consulting physicians under the generally
accepted standards of medical practice ....
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. The court indicated that the factors the surrogate
should consider include, but are not limited to, relief of suffering, preservation or restoration of
normal functions, the quality and extent of life sustained, and the impact upon the patient's
loved ones. Id.
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Ultimately, the court decided that the proper person to act as Mr.
Herbert's surrogate was his wife.11° She was not only familiar with her
husband's wishes, I " but was also motivated only by love and concern for
her husband." 2 The court noted that there is no legal requirement that
the surrogate be a court appointed guardian," 3 but if the court had been
petitioned to appoint a guardian, the patient's wife would have qualified
as such under existing California law." 4 Thus, she had full legal author-
ity to authorize the physicians to discontinue treatment," 5 since there is
no legal requirement that the surrogate seek court permission prior to
taking such an action."
6
B. Analysis of the Court
The Barber court effectively adopted the Quinlan variation of the
substituted judgment model." 7 The only differences between Barber and
Quinlan are: (1) Quinlan requires consultation with a hospital "Ethics
Committee" before the life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn,
18
whereas Barber only requires that consulting physicians concur in the
diagnosis and prognosis;" 9 (2) Barber allows the surrogate to be someone
other than a court appointed guardian; 2 ' and (3) Quinlan extends
greater protection from liability to participants in the decision.' 2 ' Only
the third difference is significant.
The first difference merely involves who should be consulted. Both
Barber and Quinlan seek to ensure that the proper diagnosis has been
made, requiring the attending physician(s) to consult with others. Under
Quinlan, an Ethics Committee should concur with this diagnosis.122 The
Quinlan court indicated that use of these committees would diffuse the
professional responsibility for the decision, and would protect patients by
screening out cases which might be contaminated by less than worthy
110. Id.
111. Mr. Herbert had indicated to his wife that he would not want to be kept alive by
machines or to "'become another Karen Ann Quinlan."' Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1020-21, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
114. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. See CAL. PROBATE CODE § 1812 (West 1981).
115. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
116. Id. ("[I]n the absence of legislative guidance, we find no legal requirement that prior
judicial approval is necessary before any decision to withdraw treatment can be made."). See
infra note 140 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
118. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54, 355 A.2d 647, 671, cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
119. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. 482, 492 (1983).
120. Id. at 1020-21, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
121. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54-55, 355 A.2d at 671-72.
122. Id.
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motivations of family or physician. 123 Although Barber does not specifi-
cally state a reason for requiring a consulting physician to concur in the
diagnosis, the general trend of the decision seems to be consistent with
Quinlan's reasoning. At various points in its decision the Barber court
refers to the opinions of the testifying experts who agreed with the prog-
nosis of the physicians, 24 the preference for the patient to be the ultimate
decision-maker, 2 ' the family's "love and concern" as motivation for the
decision,'26 and the physicians' deference to the feelings of the family. 127
All of these facts indicate that the court was concerned with what was
best for the patient. The consultation requirement can thus be seen as a
protective measure, designed to ensure that the correct diagnosis has
been made.
The second difference between Barber and Quinlan seems to be lim-
ited to the facts of Barber. Not only was there complete unanimity of
opinion among Mr. Herbert's close relatives (including Mrs. Herbert)
that treatment should be withdrawn, but if they had gone to court Mrs.
Herbert would have been appointed guardian. 2 ' Also, the physicians
were merely trying to implement the family's wishes, and would have
continued treatment if the family so desired. 29 Had there been any dis-
sension among the family or the physicians, the case would have ended
up in court, as the dissenting party would have sought an injunction to
prevent the withdrawal of treatment. Since the Barber court did not
exclude guardianship procedures in future cases, 13 presumably if peti-
tioned for an injunction in the future the court would evaluate the situa-
tion and appoint a guardian. This would be the same procedure as
outlined in Quinlan. Thus, only if the interested parties completely agree
in the decision, as in Barber, is there any difference from Quinlan.
The third difference between the cases is the scope of protection
from civil and criminal liability. The Quinlan court, after setting out a
specific procedure, 13 1 provided that any participant in the withdrawal,
including the guardian, physician or hospital, would be protected from
civil or criminal liability if he, she or it followed this procedure. 132 The
123. Id. at 50, 355 A.2d at 669.
124. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
127. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
128. Id. at 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
129. Id. at 1020, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
130. Id. at 1020-21, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 492-93.
131. See infra note 162.
132. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54-55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d
1209 (1985), modifies and limits Quinlan's protection from liability in cases involving patients
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Barber court, on the other hand, did not expressly grant protection from
liability. Since the court protected the physicians in Barber from liability
based on the particular facts of the case, x33 physicians in similar cases in
the future should be protected. Other physicians, however, will have to
rely on the proportionate/disproportionate test, which is subject to sec-
ond-guessing by the courts. 34 The Quinlan decision thus provides much
greater protection to physicians than does Barber.3 '
In addition to adopting the Quinlan variation of the substituted
judgment model, the Barber court also effectively adopted the California
Natural Death Act's definition of "life-sustaining procedure" for use in
the proportionate/disproportionate test. 136 Under the California Natural
Death Act, a life-sustaining procedure which may be withheld is defined
as a procedure which artificially maintains a vital function of the patient
and which "serve[s] only to artificially prolong the moment of death."' 37
As the Barber court noted, respirators and medical nutrition and
hydration do not address the pathology; rather, they merely sustain bio-
logical functions while other processes address the pathology. 3 ' When
other treatment becomes futile, these processes can be discontinued as
disproportionate. 139 Implicit in this part of the court's decision is that, at
this point in the treatment, procedures which do not address the pathol-
ogy are only artificially prolonging the moment of death. Thus the court
has effectively extended section 7187(c) so that it covers patients in irre-
versible vegetative comas who have not executed a living will.
IV. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS
Although the California Court of Appeal was able to provide some
guidance for physicians by its decision in Barber, the question of liability
is still unsettled. The courts have consistently stated that the legislature
is the proper branch of government to set guidelines in this area."4
in nursing homes. In those cases the participants are free from liability only if there is no bad
faith. Id. at 385, 486 A.2d at 1242.
133. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493.
134. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
135. See infra note 163.
136. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017-18, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
137. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1985). The North Carolina
Natural Death Act has a comparable definition of "extraordinary means." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-321(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
138. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
139. Id. at 1019, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491.
140. See, eg., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983):
[Tihe only long term solution to this problem is necessarily legislative in nature. It is
that body which much address the moral, social, ethical, medical and legal issues
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However, most legislatures have not acted, except for enacting statutes
authorizing living wills. 14 1 California was the first state to pass such leg-
islation in 1976, and since then a number of states have followed.142 A
review of the California Natural Death Act will reveal the weaknesses of
such a restrictive statute.
143
A. The California Natural Death Act
In passing the Natural Death Act,"4 the California Legislature spe-
raised by cases such as the one at bench. Manifestly, this court cannot attempt to
rewrite the statutory definition of death or set forth guidelines covering all possible
future cases.
Id. at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 488; In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d
266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981):
It should be emphasized though, that any guidance we may provide for future cases
is necessarily limited. Unlike the Legislature, the courts are neither equipped nor
empowered to prescribe substantive or procedural rules for all, most, or even the
more common contingencies. Our role, especially in matters as sensitive as these, is
limited to resolving the issues raised by facts presented in particular cases.
Id. at 370, 420 N.E.2d at 67, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 269 (footnote omitted); Severns v. Wilmington
Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980):
Given the community values at stake, specific action by the General Assembly is
most desirable.... [WMe earnestly invite the prompt attention of the General As-
sembly to them, with the hope that it will enact a comprehensive State policy gov-
erning these matters, which are, in the words of Quinlan, "of transcendent
importance."
Id. at 1346 (citation omitted); Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980):
Because the issue with all its ramifications is fraught with complexity and encom-
passes the interests of the law, both civil and criminal, medical ethics and social
morality, it is not one which is well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial
proceeding. It is the type issue which is more suitably addressed in the legislative
forum, where fact finding can be less confined and the viewpoints of all interested
institutions and disciplines can be presented and synthesized. In this manner only
can the subject be dealt with comprehensively and the interests of all institutions and
individuals be properly accommodated.
Id. at 360. See also supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
141. Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have passed living will legislation, see
supra note 7, yet only Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon and Virginia have
adopted provisions covering patients in irreversible vegetative comas who have not executed
living wills. North Carolina was the first to adopt such a statute in 1977, and the others
followed in 1983 and 1984. See infra notes 166-202 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the North Carolina Act and a comparison to the other four acts.
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has recently under-
taken to draft a uniform living will statute. Reaves, Living Wills, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1984, at 29.
142. See supra note 7.
143. The weaknesses of the California Act were apparent at the time it was proposed, which
prompted a number of people to urge Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr. not to sign the legisla-
tion. Rosoff, Living Wills and Natural Death Acts, in LEGAL AND ETHICAL ASPECTS OF
TREATING CRITICALLY AND TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS (A.E. Douder and J.D. Peters eds.
1982).
144. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985). See Appendix A
(full text of the Act).
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cifically recognized that adults have the fundamental right14 5 to decide to
have life-sustaining procedures withdrawn in the event of terminal ill-
ness, especially since the treatment for such an illness often causes unnec-
essary pain and suffering without providing any medical benefit.146
However, in many cases the patient is unable to give his or her consent at
the time that further treatment becomes futile, because the patient is co-
matose or has become otherwise incapacitated. Accordingly, the patient
is allowed to give his or her consent in advance by executing a living
will.147 Then, when the patient is diagnosed as having a terminal condi-
tion148 by two physicians, one of whom is the attending physician,149 the
attending physician may rely on the patient's prior informed consent (the
living will) to discontinue treatment. The physician is specifically ex-
empted from civil or criminal liability when acting in accordance with a
valid living will. 150
There are, however, significant limitations in the California Act. A
living will is not binding unless executed at least fourteen days after diag-
nosis of the terminal condition. 51 It remains binding for only five years,
after which it must be reexecuted.15 2 Lastly, a binding living will cannot
be executed by a patient in a nursing home, unless one of the witnesses is
a patient advocate designated by the California Department of Aging at
the nursing home.
1 53
The California Natural Death Act therefore excludes a large
145. "[T]he theoretical basis of the California Act is couched in terms of the right to pri-
vacy." Comment, North Carolina's Natural Death Act: Confronting Death With Dignity, 14
WAKE FOREST L. REv. 771, 782 (1978).
146. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1985).
147. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 contains the form that must be used in a valid
living will, as well as the procedure necessary to effectuate it. The document must be signed by
the declarant in the presence of two witnesses who are not blood relatives, are not entitled to
any portion of the declarant's estate, and who are not an attending physician or an employee
thereof.
148. A terminal condition is defined in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(f) (West
Supp. 1985).
149. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(e) (West Supp. 1985).
150. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1985).
151. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1985). A living will which was
executed prior to this time is, if not reexecuted, only advisory, and the physician may or may
not implement it, whichever he determines to be the best course of action. CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7191(c) (West Supp. 1985). A physician who implements an "advisory" liv-
ing will remains exempt from criminal or civil liability. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 7190 (West Supp. 1985).
152. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1985). A living will may be
revoked by the patient at any time, without regard to the patient's mental competency at the
time. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189 (West Supp. 1985).
153. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188.5 (West Supp. 1985).
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number of patients. Firstly, it excludes all patients who are unable to
remain conscious for fourteen days after the diagnosis of the terminal
condition. This category is made up mostly of patients who enter a coma
quickly, and it is only the advent of the coma that indicates that the
patient's condition is terminal.154 It also excludes patients who are not
competent at the time the diagnosis is made.' 5 Secondly, the statute
excludes patients who live for more than five years after the initial diag-
nosis, but are no longer competent at the end of that time, and therefore
cannot legally reexecute a living will. 5 6 Even if these patients had exe-
cuted a living will after the original diagnosis, it would no longer be bind-
ing.1 57 Finally, the statute excludes all patients who never execute a
living will at all. 158
154. See, eg., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983)
(healthy man suffered cardiorespiratory arrest after routine operation and entered a coma);
Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980) (man in good health suffered
cardiac arrest during surgery, resulting in irreversible vegetative coma), modified sub nom., In
re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981);
In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (previously unimpaired woman stopped breathing for
fifteen minutes, was comatose by the time she reached the hospital), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
155. See, eg., In re Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134 (1978) (woman
diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease subsequently entered irreversible vegetative coma due
to massive stroke).
156. See, eg., Dinnerstein, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 466, 380 N.E.2d 134. Although Mrs. Dinner-
stein was not diagnosed as having Alzheimer's disease until 1975, symptoms were observed as
early as 1972. Id. at 467, 380 N.E.2d at 135. Assuming the diagnosis had been made at that
time, Mrs. Dinnerstein could have executed a living will under the California Act. Since
Alzheimer's disease causes progressive degeneration of mental and physical capabilities, id. at
466-67, 380 N.E.2d at 134-35, when the living will had to be reexecuted in 1977 to remain
binding, she was no longer competent. Id. at 467, 380 N.E.2d at 135. Thus, she could not
reexecute the living will and, in 1978 when she entered the coma, the 1972 living will would no
longer have been binding. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1985).
157. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1985). If a living will is binding
at the advent of a coma, however, it remains binding for the duration of the coma. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1985).
158. A living will can be executed by anyone, even though it is not binding unless all of the
conditions of the Act are met. If all of the conditions are not met, then the living will is merely
evidence of the patient's intent, and should be considered as part of the "totality of circum-
stances known to the attending physician" in deciding whether or not to withdraw treatment.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(c) (West Supp. 1985). However, there is evidence that
most people are unwilling to execute living wills, even if a living will is consistent with their
feelings. See, e-g., Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,
493 (1983) (patient did not execute a living will despite his express intent not to be kept alive
by machines or to "'become another Karen Ann Quinlan' "); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d
431, 440, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517, 526 (1980) (patient had indicated he "would not want any of this
extraordinary business ... to be done for him" and that he "want[ed] to go," but did not
execute a living will), modified sub nom. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438
N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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Since there is no established procedure for dealing with patients in
irreversible vegetative comas who have not executed binding living wills,
these cases are effectively forced into the court system. The courts have
reluctantly accepted such cases, but only by default.159 Although some
courts have indicated that prior court approval is not necessary in order
to deal with patients in irreversible vegetative comas,'" as a practical
matter, there is no way that physicians who withdraw treatment from
patients in irreversible vegetative comas can be sure that they will not
later be subject to liability unless they obtain prior court permission. The
ordinary/extraordinary and proportionate/disproportionate tests are
highly subjective, and diagnosis under them is susceptible to second-
guessing."' Only Quinlan has set forth any specific guidelines162 and
offered immunity to physicians acting under them.'63 Despite Barber's
159. See supra note 140.
160. See supra note 51.
161. No rational person would intentionally subject himself to criminal liability needlessly.
Therefore, it is clear that the physicians in Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006,
195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983), thought they had a patient who satisfied one of the two tests. If
they were uncertain, they could have refused to follow the family's request, forcing the matter
into the courts, which would have protected them from liability. See supra notes 52-53 and
accompanying text. Despite the physicians' certainty, they were second-guessed and charged
with murder. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
162. There must be a diagnosis by the attending physician of "no reasonable possibility" of
returning to a cognitive, sapient state; a decision by the family and guardian to disconnect; and
concurrence in the diagnosis by a hospital Ethics Committee. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54-
55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976). Other cases have refused to
endorse the Quinlan methodology, holding that such a procedure, if necessary, should be es-
tablished by the legislature. See, eg., Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491
(compared to Quinlan, supra text accompanying notes 117-35); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363,
382-83, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). See also
Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 758-59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434
(1977) (rejecting the Quinlan methodology and requiring court approval).
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently refused to extend Quinlan to comatose patients
in nursing homes. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 342 n.1, 486 A.2d 1209, 1219 n.1 (1985). Be-
cause of the differences between hospitals and nursing homes, the Conroy procedure requires
the guardian to report his intention to withdraw treatment to the Office of the Ombudsman,
who must treat the proposal as an "abuse," obtain confirmation of the diagnosis and prognosis
from two physicians (other than the treating physician), and make a report to the appropriate
regulatory agency. Id. at 383-84, 486 A.2d at 1241-42. If the subjective test, see supra note 28,
is being used, then the guardian needs only the concurrence of the attending physician. 98
N.J. at 384, 486 A.2d at 1242. If either the limited-objective or pure-objective test, see supra
note 28, is being used, then the family should also concur. 98 N.J. at 384-85, 486 A.2d at 1242.
163. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 54-55, 355 A.2d at 671-72. Although other cases have indicated
that court approval is not necessary in all cases, see supra note 51, none of these cases have
expressly granted physicians protection from liability. Impliedly, these cases have granted im-
munity to physicians who withdraw treatment from a patient who satisfies the test established
by the courts of their jurisdiction (either ordinary/extraordinary or proportionate/dispropor-
tionate). However, these tests are subjective, and are limited in their scope. See, eg., Barber,
147 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493 ("[W]e conclude that the petitioners' omission
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attempt to provide some guidelines for physicians in the absence of legis-
lation, 16' the very fact that there was an attempt to prosecute any physi-
cian will probably make physicians in future cases wary of withdrawing
treatment without prior court approval, especially since Barber extended
only limited protection to physicians.1
65
B. The North Carolina Natural Death Act
The first statute passed that expressly sets forth a procedure to cover
all comatose patients was the North Carolina Natural Death Act. 166 The
Act provides for a living will on substantially the same grounds as the
California Natural Death Act. 167 The major differences between the two
acts are: (1) the North Carolina Act makes all living wills valid, not just
those living wills executed fourteen days after diagnosis of the terminal
condition; (2) the North Carolina Act places no restrictions on living
wills executed in nursing homes; and (3) the North Carolina Act requires
that the living will be notarized. However, the North Carolina Act also
provides for comatose patients in the absence of a living will. 168 This is
to continue treatment under the circumstances... was not an unlawful failure to perform a
legal duty." (emphasis added)). Only Quinlan has extended protection to physicians in a
quantifiable manner that can be determined in advance, even if the particular facts differ from
prior cases. 70 N.J. at 54-55, 355 A.2d at 671-72 (If the procedures described are followed,
there can be no civil or criminal liability for "any participant, whether guardian, physician,
hospital or others.").
164. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1018, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. See supra note 116.
165. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1022, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 493. See supra notes 116 and 163.
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-322 (1981 & Supp. 1983). See Appendix B (full text
of the Act). The statute was originally enacted in 1977. Since that time four other states have
added similar provisions. In 1983 Oregon added § 97.083 to its Natural Death Act and Vir-
ginia enacted a Natural Death Act which included § 54-325.8:6. In 1984 Louisiana enacted a
Natural Death Act which included § 40:1299.58.5 and New Mexico added § 24-7-8.1 to its
Right to Die Act. The differences between these statutes and the North Carolina Act will be
discussed as the latter is analyzed.
Additionally, five states have enacted medical consent statutes which delineate who may
authorize medical treatment. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9-1 to 31-9-7 (1985); IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-4301 to 39-4306 (1985); MD. PuB. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 20-102 (1982); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 41-41-3 to 41-41-11 (1981 & Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5 (1977). Im-
plicit in these statutes is the power to authorize no medical treatment-to refuse it. This type
of statute is inferior to the North Carolina type of statute because it does not indicate the
circumstances under which treatment can be legally withdrawn or withheld.
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322 (Supp. 1983). If the phrase "or is mentally incapacitated"
is removed from N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a), then the Act would be limited to patients in
irreversible vegetative comas. With that language included, the Act also covers incompetent
patients with terminal illnesses. See supra note 8. Louisiana and Oregon restrict their statutes
to comatose patients, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.5 (West Supp. 1985); OR. REV.
STAT. § 97.083 (1983), while the laws of New Mexico and Virginia are similar to that of North
Carolina. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-8.1 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1984).
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an improvement over all other acts since it covers a class of people ig-
nored by the other acts. 16 9
The North Carolina Act is also superior to the Quinlan procedure
because it is more specific. 170 As discussed above, Quinlan requires the
use of an Ethics Committee that must confirm the diagnosis before treat-
ment can be withdrawn,171 but it does not delineate the composition of
such a committee. Presumably it should contain at least one physician in
order to confirm the diagnosis of the attending physician,172 but there is
no requirement that a physician be one of the members. 173 One wonders
if a confirmation of a diagnosis of irreversible vegetative coma made by
an Ethics Committee without a physician as one of its members would be
valid, or if the decision would withstand subsequent review. 174 Another
problem arises if the Committee's decision is less than unani-
mous. Presumably, a majority of the Committee would be sufficient to
constitute a confirmation of the decision to withdraw treatment, but
again Quinlan is silent on the issue.175 Section 90-322 of the North Caro-
lina Act solves these problems by specifying that the confirmation must
169. See supra notes 154-58 and accompanying text.
170. The problems brought on by lack of specificity were recognized by the Delaware
Supreme Court in Severns v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (1980):
If there is a disagreement among the persons involved who are competent to make a
responsible judgment in the matter, how is that to be resolved? Should any decision
be unanimous? If not, whose vote controls? In what way are hospital administrative
or ethics committees involved in the problem and how are they affected by a deci-
sion? What are the prevailing medical/hospital ethics which are relevant to the is-
sue? Is there a consensus as to such ethics?
Id. at 1349-50.
171. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 54-55, 355 A.2d 647, 671-72, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922
(1976).
172. Quinlan only requires the attending physician(s) to make the diagnosis; it does not
require any confirmation of the diagnosis except by the Ethics Committee. Id.
173. The Quinlan court seems to presume that a physician will be one of the members of the
committee, since it refers to existing "'Ethics Committee[s] composed of physicians, social
workers, attorneys, and theologians.'" Id. at 49, 355 A.2d at 668 (quoting Teel, The Physi-
cian's Dilemma: A Doctor's View: What The Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 8-9
(1975)). The court does not make a physician's membership on the committee mandatory,
however. See infra note 177.
174. The ability of the decision to withstand judicial review is particularly important, since
judicial review may be necessary if a person who disagrees with the decision decides to file a
wrongful death suit.
175. Unless a majority of the committee were physicians, it is conceivable that no physician
would be in the majority voting to allow withdrawal. Again, the validity of such a decision
would be uncertain. Perhaps the Quinlan court was trying to give latitude to each hospital to
set its own standards, but this could lead to conflicting rules (it is not hard to imagine that
some hospitals may be so strict that treatment could never be withheld, while other hospitals
are so lax that any decision could be confirmed), as well as uncertainty over the legality of the
action (it is axiomatic that the less specific the guidelines, the greater the risk of being second-
guessed, see supra note 161 and accompanying text).
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be made in writing by a physician other than the attending physician. 176
Section 90-322 also improves on Quinlan by specifying who the sur-
rogate decision-maker should be. Quinlan only refers to "the concur-
rence of the guardian and family" of the patient, and the amorphous
"Ethics Committee." 177  Again, it is not clear whether this means a
unanimous decision of guardian and family, a decision by the guardian
after consultation with the family, or an action by the guardian as the
agent of the family. The North Carolina Act specifically designates the
decision-maker as the patient's spouse, guardian, or a majority of rela-
tives of the first degree, in that order, if available. 178 This definitive state-
ment leaves no doubt about the legality of the decision-either the
statutory procedure was observed or it was not.
Besides covering a class of patients excluded by other statutes, the
176. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
177. Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 55, 355 A.2d at 671. Quinlan also does not define what viewpoints
should be represented on the Ethics Committee, which must confirm any decision. The only
indication in Quinlan of the composition of the committee is the reference to some existing
committees. Id. at 49-50, 355 A.2d at 668-69 (quoting Teel, The Physician's Dilemma: A
Doctor's View: What The Law Should Be, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 6, 8-9 (1975)). See supra note
173. The membership of the committee is one of the largest problems with the Quinlan proce-
dure. If a physician is to be one of the members, should he or she be an outside consultant, or
someone from within the hospital such as the Chief of Staff? Should the physician's spot be
filled by a specialist, such as a neurologist, or are a number of specialists necessary? Should a
majority of the committee be physicians? See supra note 175. If one member is to be a com-
munity representative, how can one person be chosen who represents the views of the entire
community? Should a number of such positions be created and be filled in proportion to the
ideological breakdown of the community? If one member is to represent a religious point of
view, which religion should he or she represent? Should this position be rotated depending
upon the religion of the patient involved? What about agnostics and atheists? Should a lawyer
be on the committee to give advice on the legality of the proposed action? The debate as to
who should be represented on the committee and how the decision should be made could
conceivably deadlock a committee.
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (Supp. 1983). This is the only area where there is any
real difference in the Louisiana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon and Virginia statutes.
New Mexico provides that treatment can only be withdrawn or withheld upon the concurrence
of "all family members who can be contacted through reasonable diligence." N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 24-7-8.1(A) (Supp. 1984). Louisiana, Oregon and Virginia, on the other hand, are
similar to North Carolina in providing a list of people.
Louisiana requires the attending physician to consult with the tutor or curator of the
patient (if one has been appointed), the spouse, adult child, parents, or other ascendants or
descedants, in that order. If there is more than one person in the applicable class then the
decision must be made by everyone in that class who is reasonably available. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 40:1299.58.5 (West Supp. 1985). Oregon requires the physician to consult with the
spouse, guardian, majority of adult children, or either parent, in that order. OR. REV. STAT.
§ 97.083(2) (1983). Virginia requires consultation with the judically appointed guardian (if
one previously had been appointed), the person(s) designated by the patient in writing, the
spouse, an adult child or a majority of the adult children if there are more than one, the
parents, or the nearest living relative, in that order. VA. CODE § 54-325.8:6 (Supp. 1984).
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North Carolina Act has a number of other advantages. First, the patient
is offered significant protection. A physician must first diagnose the pa-
tient's condition as terminal, incurable and irreversible before treatment
may be withdrawn. 179 By requiring that all three conditions be met, the
statute virtually assures that no patient who could potentially recover
will be disconnected from life-support apparatus. The statute provides
additional assurance that the diagnosis has been made correctly by re-
quiring that the diagnosis be confirmed in writing by a physician other
than the attending physician.180
Additionally, treatment can be withdrawn only under the supervi-
sion of the attending physician,18' so the physician can refuse to comply
if there are some doubts about the family's motives. If the family tries to
bring in a new physician who is willing to comply with their decision, the
supplanted physician can report the conduct. This would require the
family to prove in court that they are acting in the patient's best
interest. 182
179. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)(1) (Supp. 1983). The Louisiana, New Mexico, Oregon
and Virginia statutes are similar, even though they use different terms to describe the condi-
tion. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.2(8) (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-
7-8.1(A) (Supp. 1984); OR. REv. STAT. § 97.083(a) (1983); VA. CODE § 54-325.8:6 (Supp.
1984).
180. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
181. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (Supp. 1983).
182. As for the prospect of collusion to kill a patient in the absence of judicial review, such
collusion, at a minimum, would require the cooperation of the entire family, the attending and
consulting physicians, and all of the medical staff involved, since each of these people would,
presumably, be fully aware of the status of the patient. If any one person suspected foul play,
he or she could report the actions to the proper authorities. It should be remembered that it
was the report of a nurse that led to the arrests of the two physicians in Barber. See supra note
64 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, if the case reached the courts through reported misdeeds, no treatment
could be withdrawn until a court was satisfied that the action was in the patient's best interest.
Although there is no requirement in the North Carolina Natural Death Act that a court be
consulted, there is no prohibition against the use of the court system either. In fact, the Act
could be amended to require the use of the courts, if the legislature decided that to be the best
course. Presumably, the state's interest in preserving life would allow intervention. See, eg.,
In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 634, 405 N.E.2d 115, 119 (1980) (a balance should be achieved
between "the individual interest against countervailing State interests, particularly the State
interest in the preservation of life"); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664
("[u]ltimately there comes a point at which the individual's rights overcome the State interest"
in preserving life, which implies that there are cases where the state's interest overrides the
individual's interests), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160,
162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) ("[tlhere can be no doubt that the State does have an interest in
preserving life" (emphasis in original)), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980). If treatment had
already been withdrawn, the principals involved could be be prosecuted for murder. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-320(b) (1981) ("Nothing in this Article shall be construed to authorize any
affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of
dying."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(d) (Supp. 1983) ("Any person, institution or facility
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Second, the family is spared many burdens. They do not have to
bear the expense of protracted medical care for a hopeless patient,183 nor
must they incur the expense of a legal battle to withdraw treatment.
1 84
The family is also spared the psychological and emotional burden of
watching a loved one, possibly in pain,8  slowly wither away.'8 6 After
being assured that there is no chance for recovery, 187 the family can de-
cide what is best for the patient and implement that decision quickly.
1 88
against whom criminal or civil liability is asserted because of conduct in compliance with this
section may interpose this section as a defense." (emphasis added). The obvious corollary to
this is that a person who does not follow the procedures and restrictions of the Act will not be
protected by this section.). The fear of prosecution alone should deter physicians from collud-
ing, since it involves a very serious risk, and they have very little to gain (as opposed to some-
one who may be entitled to a portion of the estate).
If all of these people were colluding, they could also collude to fool a court in a system
that requires court approval. Thus, the danger of improper withdrawal of treatment is no
greater under the North Carolina Act than under any other system.
183. For example, in one case the cost of a respirator and dialysis for a comatose patient
was $2,000 a day. Siegel, Medical Quandary: Bioethics Seeks Rules for Dying, L.A. Times,
Jan. 6, 1985, § 1, at 1, 32, col. 1. Even if a patient is stable enough to be cared for outside of a
hospital, care can still be expensive. At one hospice the average cost is $22,000 a year per
patient. Siegel, Physician and Policy-Maker: Hospice Doctor Torn by Dilemma, L.A. Times,
Jan. 6, 1985, § 1, at 32, 33, col. 2.
184. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
185. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 25, 355 A.2d 647, 655 ("the quality of [Ms. Quin-
lan's] feeling impulses is unknown"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Barber v. Superior
Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1021 n.2, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 493 n.2 (1983) (the family was
"concerned for [Mr. Herbert's] comfort"); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 442, 426
N.Y.S.2d 517, 528 (1980) (Brother Fox "'has convulsive episodes'. . . and sensory response to
stimuli" (quoting testimony of Dr. Kelley, the attending physician)), modified sub nom., In re
Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
186. The Quinlan court's description of Ms. Quinlan's physical state aptly demonstrates the
source of this burden:
Karen is described as emanciated, having suffered a weight loss of at least 40
pounds, and undergoing a continuing deteriorative process. Her posture is described
as fetal-like and grotesque; there is extreme flexion-rigidity of the arms, legs and
related muscles and her joints are severely rigid and deformed.
She is debilitated and moribund ....
Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 26, 355 A.2d at 655.
187. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
188. "[W]e. .. perceive the judicial process as an unresponsive and cumbersome mecha-
nism for decisions of this nature. This fact is borne out by a number of the leading cases in
which arguments were heard... long after the patient had died." In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d
114, 127, 660 P.2d 738, 746 (1983), subsequently modified on other grounds, In re Guardian-
ship of Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984). See also supra note 47 and accompa-
nying text. See also the following cases in which the parenthetically indicated time periods
passed between the advent of the coma and final judicial action: In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355
A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (one year, seven months); Eichner v. Dillon, 73
A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980), modified sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420
N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (two years); In re Colyer, 99
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Since most courts follow the decision of the family in any event,189 the
statutory procedure saves a lot of wasted time and effort.
Third, physicians are protected from liability.190 The statute specifi-
cally exempts from civil or criminal liability any person acting under the
statute and in accordance with its provisions. 191 Although the statute
does not expressly protect physicians from liability for an incorrect diag-
nosis of a terminal, incurable and irreversible condition,192 it does in fact
provide some protection in such a situation. By requiring that the diag-
nosis be confirmed in writing by an independent physician,193 the statute
not only makes an incorrect diagnosis less likely, 194 but also makes it
more difficult to prove. Any person who challenges the diagnosis has the
additional burden of proving that both physicians, who had reached their
decisions independently, were incorrect.' 95 Since the concurring physi-
Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (one year); Leach v. Akron Medical Center, 68 Ohio Misc. 1, 426
N.E.2d 809 (1981) (six months).
189. See, ag., In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (decision of father to withdraw
treatment approved), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405
N.E.2d 115 (1980) (court approved decision of wife and son to withdraw treatment); Severns v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 421 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1980) (petition of husband to discon-
tinue treatment granted); Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 426 N.Y.S.2d 517 (1980) (leader
of religious order allowed to withdraw treatment from one of the order's members), modified
sub nom., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert denied, 454
U.S. 858 (1981). But see In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266
(decision of mother to discontinue treatment overruled), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
190. See supra notes 131-35, 161-65 and accompanying text.
191. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(d) (Supp. 1983). The protection from civil liability would
include not only malpractice, but also charges of unprofessional conduct, and tort liability
such as wrongful death.
Section 90-321(h) contains exactly the same language, thus extending protection to physi-
cians acting pursuant to living wills. Interestingly, California provides even more protection
since it not only protects physicians acting pursuant to living wills, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1985), but also physicians who refuse to follow a living will. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b)-(c) (West Supp. 1985). If a physician refuses to imple-
ment a binding living will, however, he or she must make arrangements for the transfer of the
patient to a physician who will implement it, or else face charges of unprofessional conduct.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1985).
192. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
193. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
194. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
195. In the absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, not only would the challenger
have to prove that the diagnosis was incorrect, but also that it was negligently made. As noted
in Barber:
"A physician, surgeon or dentist must exercise that degree of skill or care usual in
the profession in the place in which he practices; i.e. the standard is set by doctors of
good standing practicing in that locality. [Citations.] It follows that 'mere error of
judgment, in the absence of a want of reasonable care and skill in the application of
his medical learning to the case presented, will not render a doctor responsible for
untoward consequences in the treatment of the patient .... ' [Citation.]"
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cian's diagnosis must be in writing,196 there should be an exact record of
the factors that were considered in making the diagnosis. Such a record
could serve as persuasive proof of what actually happened, thus minimiz-
ing the possibility that the physician's diagnosis will be second-
guessed. 197
Finally, judicial economy is promoted by removing these cases from
the court system. The judicial system is already overcrowded, and these
cases only add to the congestion by requiring both a hearing and subse-
quent appeals.19 Additionally, the court system is "ill-suited" to handle
cases of this sort. 19 9 The North Carolina Act resolves this problem by
removing the court system from the decision, leaving the choice in the
hands of the family.2 °" The courts, however, are still able to act as a
"fail-safe" mechanism in the system in case someone suspects that the
action is illegal.2 °0 The courts would thus have to hear only a few cases
where their protection is needed, rather than every case, including the
routine ones, as they must do under the present system.2 °2
C. Application to Barber
As yet, no cases have been decided under the North Carolina Natu-
ral Death Act,2"3 but the facts of Barber provide an excellent vehicle to
illustrate how the Act would function. The analysis under the Act has
two steps: (1) determining if the patient is a qualified patient under the
Act; and (2) implementing the procedure set forth in the Act.
The initial finding required by the statute is that the patient is coma-
Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1017, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490 (1983) (quoting 4 WITKIN,
SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Torts § 514, at 2778 (8th ed. 1974)).
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
197. This assumes that the physician puts all factors considered in the diagnosis in the
written confirmation. If the writing merely contains conclusory language (i.e. "I,
, determine _ _ 's condition to be terminal, incurable and irreversible.
s/ ."), then the only protection provided is the fact that another physician agrees
with the diagnosis.
198. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 385, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 277 (Jones, J.,
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). See supra note 46.
199. See supra note 48.
200. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (Supp. 1983).
201. See supra note 182.
202. Although the physicians in Barber were not held liable even though they acted without
prior court approval, the lack of protection and guidance for future cases may bring even more
cases into the courts. See supra notes 133-34, 161-65 and accompanying text.
203. To date, the statute has been cited in only one case, in which it was decided that the
Act had no application to a homicide case and did not extend protection to criminal assailants.
State v. Holsclaw, 42 N.C. App. 696, 699, 257 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1979). No cases have cited the
Louisiana, New Mexico, Oregon or Virginia statutes.
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tose with no reasonable possibility of returning to a cognitive, sapient
state,2" and that the condition is terminal, incurable and irreversible." 5
In Barber, such a diagnosis was made by Drs. Barber and Nejdl within
three days of the advent of the coma.2 °6 Next, the Act requires that the
condition be confirmed in writing by a physician other than the attending
physician.207 Mr. Herbert's condition was confirmed by two other physi-
cians, a cardiologist and a neurologist,2 "8 thus satisfying this require-
ment. Finally, the Act requires that a vital function of the person is
being sustained, or could be restored, by extraordinary means. 20 9 This
requirement was also met since Mr. Herbert was being kept alive only by
means of the intravenous tubes to which he was connected. 210 Accord-
ingly, Mr. Herbert would have qualified as a candidate for natural death
under the North Carolina Natural Death Act.
The first procedural step under the Act, set forth in section 90-322,
is that a patient's condition must meet the requirements of subsection (a),
and that no living will has been executed.21' Mr. Herbert's condition
met these requirements,2 2 and he had not executed a living will.213 The
204. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a) (Supp. 1983).
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)(1) (Supp. 1983).
206. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484,486 (1983).
Although the physicians did not use the terms "terminal, incurable and irreversible," this was
the substantive content of their finding of "a deeply comatose state from which [Mr. Herbert]
was not likely to recover.... Mr. Herbert had suffered severe brain damage, leaving him in a
vegetative state, which was likely to be permanent." Id. at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
207. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)(2) (Supp. 1983).
208. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486; CHA INSIGHT, supra note
61, at 1. The evidence does not indicate whether or not these confirmations were in writing,
but there is no evidence that they would not have been in writing had that been the law.
209. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a)(3) (Supp. 1983). This provision addresses both with-
drawing and withholding treatment. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
210. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1011, 1018-20, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486, 491-92. See supra
notes 90-92 and accompanying text. The court used the term "disproportionate" instead of
"extraordinary." Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1018-19, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 491. See supra notes
93-95 and accompanying text.
211. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (Supp. 1983). If a living will has been executed, then
treatment may be withdrawn under § 90-321(b), and no further analysis is needed. Section 90-
321(b) contains virtually the same diagnostic requirements as § 90-322(a). See supra at notes
204-10 and accompanying text for a description of these requirements. The differences are that
§ 90-321(b) requires that the condition be diagnosed as terminal and incurable, instead of ter-
minal, incurable and irreversible, as § 90-322(a) does. Also, § 90-321(b) does not apply to
mentally incompetent patients with terminal illnesses, see supra note 8, since the patient has to
be competent in order to execute a living will. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(c) (1981).
212. Mr. Herbert was in a terminal, incurable and irreversible coma, with no reasonable
possibility of returning to a cognitive, sapient state. See supra notes 203-10 and accompanying
text.
213. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1014, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 489. Even if Mr. Herbert had
executed a living will, it would not have been binding under California law since he was not
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next step is to consult with the patient's spouse, guardian, or relatives of
the first degree, in that order, if available.21 4 After receiving consent, the
extraordinary means of support may be withheld or withdrawn. 5 In
Barber, Drs. Barber and Nejdl informed Mrs. Herbert of the diagnosis
and prognosis, and she and her children decided to have the treatment
withdrawn.2'16 Thus, the treatment could have been withdrawn from Mr.
Herbert in compliance with the North Carolina Act upon the direction
and under the supervision of the attending physician.217
Since all of the conditions of section 90-322(a) were met and all of
the procedures of section 90-322(b) were followed, the physicians in Bar-
ber would have been protected from both civil and criminal liability.2 8
Thus, if the North Carolina Act had been applicable, the physicians
could not have been charged with murder and conspiracy to commit
murder, as they actually were.2" 9 Since the result reached by the court
system after the case was presented to a municipal court magistrate, a
superior court judge, and the court of appeal 220 was the same result
which would have been achieved under the North Carolina Act, there
was no gain to the patient or his family by requiring the courts to hear
this case, and a lot of time, money and effort was wasted.
V. CONCLUSION
The procedure used by the California Court of Appeal in its final
decision in Barber was almost identical to the procedure outlined by the
North Carolina Natural Death Act.221 It is also very similar to the pro-
cedure which was used in Quinlan.222 The advantage that the North
Carolina Act has over the procedures outlined in Quinlan and Barber is
conscious 14 days after the diagnosis, and so could not reexecute it. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1985). See supra notes 151, 154 and accompanying text.
214. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (Supp. 1983).
215. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (Supp. 1983).
216. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010-11, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486. Only Mrs. Herbert's
permission would be required under the Act, however. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (Supp.
1983).
217. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(b) (Supp. 1983).
218. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(d) (Supp. 1983).
219. Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1010, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 486.
220. Id.
221. See supra notes 203-20 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 117-35 and accompanying text. A variation of the Quinlan procedure
was also used by the lower court in Eichner v. Dillon, 73 A.D.2d 431, 476-77, 426 N.Y.S.2d
517, 550 (1980), but this approach was rejected on appeal. In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 383,
420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276 ("[A] mandatory procedure [for dealing with pa-
tients in irreversible vegetative comas] ... should come from the Legislature."), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 858 (1981).
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that it is more specific2 23 and more flexible. A statute may be amended
to provide for incompetent patients with terminal illnesses, 24 to provide
for the use of a guardian, 25 or to provide for the use of an Ethics Com-
mittee along the lines of Quinlan.2 6 Although the withdrawal of naso-
gastric tubes has been found to be legal in two cases, 27 and approved by
some commentators, 228 the fact that few physicians would follow such a
procedure229 indicates that there is still a substantial difference of opinion
on this issue. A state could, when adopting the legislation, define ex-
traordinary (disproportionate) treatment so as not to include nasogastric
tubes, if that is the consensus of that particular community. Each state
could thus adapt the legislation to its particular needs.
Additionally, by adopting the substituted judgment model via stat-
ute, each state would provide much needed relief to the dilemma physi-
cians now face. A specific procedure, with the guarantee of protection
from liability for following the procedure, would allow physicians to act
with certainty.230 They could thus concentrate on the course of treat-
ment that would be best for the patient, not the course of action that
protects them from liability, since the two courses would be the same.
The North Carolina Natural Death Act, or a variation thereof, thus
provides the best solution to the problem. As medical technology pro-
gresses, more of these cases will arise. Without a definitive law, these
cases will undoubtedly end up in the courts. As they do, the courts may
use Barber's proportionate/disproportionate test to resolve them, since it
223. See supra notes 170-78 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 168.
225. This could be done by changing § 90-322(b) to read: "the extraordinary means to
prolong life may be withheld or discontinued upon the direction and under the supervision of
the attending physician with the concurrence of the legal guardian of the person." This would
allow the courts to evaluate the qualifications of the person seeking to withdraw treatment, if
that is what the legislature decides is best. This would also be consistent with the Massachu-
setts courts' disapproval of removing these cases from the courts. See supra notes 41-44 and
accompanying text.
226. A legislative statement would eliminate the problem of lack of specificity in the mem-
bership of such a committee, see supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text, since the composi-
tion would be listed in the statute.
227. Barber v. Superior Court, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 1016-17, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 490
(1983); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 374, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236-37 (1985).
228. In the last year, two teams of prominent physicians have published articles supporting
withdrawal of nasogastric tubes in some cases. Siegel, Medical Quandary: Bioethics Seeks
Rules for Dying, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1985, § I, at 1, 30, col. 2.
229. Arthur Caplan, a philosopher at the Hastings Center, estimates that only five percent
of all physicians would withdraw nasogastric tubes. Siegel, Medical Quandary: Bioethics Seeks
Rules for Dying, L.A. Times, Jan. 6, 1985, § I, at 1, 30, col. 2 (citing NEw ENG. J. MED. and
HASTINGS CENTER RP.).
230. See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
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is an improvement over the traditional ordinary/extraordinary test.23 1
This is not a satisfactory solution, however, because the courts will still
be required to address each case as it arises.232 Until the legislatures
adopt legislation along the lines of the North Carolina Natural Death
Act, there will be no settled procedure for dealing with patients in irre-
versible vegetative comas. Since the Act provides safeguards for pa-
tients,233 offers greater protection for physicians, 234 and is more efficient
in terms of time, money and effort expended than the current method of
handling these cases,235 similar, uniform statutes should be adopted by
each state.
Matthew G. Ainley
231. See supra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
232. See, eg., In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 383, 420 N.E.2d 64, 74, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, 276
(court refused to adopt a set procedure for dealing with patients in irreversible vegetative
comas, holding that the legislature is the body that should establish any such procedure), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981). See also supra note 140.
233. See supra notes 179-82 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 190-97 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 183-89, 218-20 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A: CALIFORNIA NATURAL DEATH ACT2 3 6
§ 7185
This act shall be known and may be cited as the Natural Death Act.
§ 7186
The Legislature finds that adult persons have the fundamental right
to control the decisions relating to the rendering of their own medical
care, including the decision to have life-sustaining procedures withheld
or withdrawn in instances of a terminal condition.
The Legislature further finds that modem medical technology has
made possible the artificial prolongation of human life beyond natural
limits.
The Legislature further finds that, in the interest of protecting indi-
vidual autonomy, such prolongation of life for persons with a terminal
condition may cause loss of patient dignity and unnecessary pain and
suffering, while providing nothing medically necessary or beneficial to
the patient.
The Legislature further finds that there exists considerable uncer-
tainty in the medical and legal professions as to the legality of terminat-
ing the use or application of life-sustaining procedures where the patient
has voluntarily and in sound mind evidenced a desire that such proce-
dures be withheld or withdrawn.
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right
to expect, the Legislature hereby declares that the laws of the State of
California shall recognize the right of an adult person to make a written
directive instructing his physician to withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining procedures in the event of a terminal condition.
§ 7187
The following definitions shall govern the construction of this
chapter:
(a) "Attending physician" means the physician selected by, or as-
signed to, the patient who has primary responsibility for the treatment
and care of the patient.
(b) "Directive" means a written document voluntarily executed by
the declarant in accordance with the requirements of Section 7188. The
directive, or a copy of the directive, shall be made part of the patient's
medical records.
(c) "Life-sustaining procedure" means any medical procedure or
236. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985).
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intervention which utilizes mechanical or other artificial means to sus-
tain, restore, or supplant a vital function, which, when applied to a quali-
fied patient, would serve only to artificially prolong the moment of death
and where, in the judgment of the attending physician, death is imminent
whether or not such procedures are utilized. "Life-sustaining proce-
dure" shall not include the administration of medication or the perform-
ance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain.
(d) "Physician" means a physician and surgeon licensed by the
Board of Medical Quality Assurance or the Board of Osteopathic
Examiners.
(e) "Qualified patient" means a patient diagnosed and certified in
writing to be afflicted with a terminal condition by two physicians, one of
whom shall be the attending physician, who have personally examined
the patient.
(f) "Terminal condition" means an incurable condition caused by
injury, disease, or illness, which, regardless of the application of life-sus-
taining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judgment, produce
death, and where the application of life-sustaining procedures serve only
to postpone the moment of death of the patient.
§ 7188
Any adult person may execute a directive directing the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in a terminal condition. The
directive shall be signed by the declarant in the presence of two witnesses
not related to the declarant by blood or marriage and who would not be
entitled to any portion of the estate of the declarant upon his decease
under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto then existing or, at the
time of the directive, by operation of law then existing. In addition, a
witness to a directive shall not be the attending physician, an employee of
the attending physician or a health facility in which the declarant is a
patient, or any person who has a claim against any portion of the estate
of the declarant upon his decease at the time of the execution of the
directive. The directive shall be in the following form:
DIRECTIVE TO PHYSICIANS
Directive made this - day of - (month, year).
I , being of sound mind, willfully, and voluntarily
make known my desire that my life shall not be artificially prolonged
under the circumstances set forth below, do hereby declare:
1. If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or ill-
ness certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians, and where the
application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to artificially
DISCONTINUING TREATMENT
prolong the moment of my death and where my physician determines
that my death is imminent whether or not life-sustaining procedures are
utilized, I direct that such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and
that I be permitted to die naturally.
2. In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use
of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this directive
shall be honored by my family and physician(s) as the final expression of
my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment and accept the
consequences from such refusal.
3. If I have been diagnosed as pregnant and that diagnosis is
known to my physician, this directive shall have no force or effect during
the course of my pregnancy.
4. I have been diagnosed and notified at least 14 days ago as hav-
ing a terminal condition by . M.D., whose address is
., and whose telephone number is . I under-
stand that if I have not filled in the physician's name and address, it shall
be presumed that I did not have a terminal condition when I made out
this directive.
5. This directive shall have no force or effect five years from the
date filled in above.
6. I understand the full import of this directive and I am emotion-
ally and mentally competent to make this directive.
Signed
City, County and State of residence_
The declarant has been personally known to me and I believe him or her




A directive shall have no force or effect if the declarant is a patient
in a skilled nursing facility as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1250 at
the time the directive is executed unless one of the two witnesses to the
directive is a patient advocate or ombudsman as may be designated by
the State Department of Aging for this purpose pursuant to any other
applicable provision of law. The patient advocate or ombudsman shall
have the same qualifications as a witness under Section 7188.
The intent of this section is to recognize that some patients in skilled
nursing facilities may be so insulated from a voluntary decisionmaking
role, by virtue of the custodial nature of their care, as to require special
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assurance that they are capable of willfully and voluntarily executing a
directive.
§ 7189
(a) A directive may be revoked at any time by the declarant, with-
out regard to his mental state or competency, by any of the following
methods:
(1) By being cancelled, defaced, obliterated, or burnt, torn, or
otherwise destroyed by the declarant or by some person in his presence
and by his direction.
(2) By a written revocation of the declarant expressing his intent
to revoke, signed and dated by the declarant. Such a revocation shall
become effective only upon communication to the attending physician by
the declarant or by a person acting on behalf of the declarant. The at-
tending physician shall record in the patient's medical record the time
and date when he received notification of the written revocation.
(3) By a verbal expression by the declarant of his intent to revoke
the directive. Such revocation shall become effective only upon commu-
nication to the attending physician by the declarant or by a person acting
on behalf of the declarant. The attending physician shall record in the
patient's medical record the time, date, and place of the revocation and
the time, date, and place, if different, of when he received notification of
the revocation.
(b) There shall be no criminal or civil liability on the part of any
person for failure to act upon a revocation made pursuant to this section
unless that person has actual knowledge of the revocation.
§ 7189.5
A directive shall be effective for five years from the date of execution
thereof unless sooner revoked in a manner prescribed in Section 7189.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prevent a declarant from
reexecuting a directive at any time in accordance with the formalities of
Section 7188, including reexecution subsequent to a diagnosis of a termi-
nal condition. If the declarant has executed more than one directive,
such time shall be determined from the date of execution of the last di-
rective known to the attending physician. If the declarant becomes co-
matose or is rendered incapable of communicating with the attending
physician, the directive shall remain in effect for the duration of the co-
matose condition or until such time as the declarant's condition renders




No physician or health facility which, acting in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter, causes the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures from a qualified patient, shall be subject to civil
liability therefrom. No licensed health professional, acting under the di-
rection of a physician, who participates in the withholding or withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter shall be subject to any civil liability. No physician, or licensed
health professional acting under the direction of a physician, who partici-
pates in the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in
accordance with the provisions of this chapter shall be guilty of any crim-
inal act or of unprofessional conduct.
§ 7191
(a) Prior to effecting a withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures from a qualified patient pursuant to the directive, the attend-
ing physician shall determine that the directive complies with Section
7188, and, if the patient is mentally competent, that the directive and all
steps proposed by the attending physician to be undertaken are in accord
with the desires of the qualified patient.
(b) If the declarant was a qualified patient at least 14 days prior to
executing or reexecuting the directive, the directive shall be conclusively
presumed, unless revoked, to be the directions of the patient regarding
the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures. No physi-
cian, and no licensed health professional acting under the direction of a
physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable for failing to effectuate the
directive of the qualified patient pursuant to this subdivision. A failure
by a physician to effectuate the directive of a qualified patient pursuant to
this division shall constitute unprofessional conduct if the physician re-
fuses to make the necessary arrangements, or fails to take the necessary
steps, to effect the transfer of the qualified patient to another physician
who will effectuate the directive of the qualified patient.
(c) If the declarant becomes a qualified patient subsequent to exe-
cuting the directive, and has not subsequently reexecuted the directive,
the attending physician may give weight to the directive as evidence of
the patient's directions regarding the withholding or withdrawal of life-
sustaining procedures and may consider other factors, such as informa-
tion from the affected family or the nature of the patient's illness, injury,
or disease, in determining whether the totality of circumstances known
to the attending physician justify effectuating the directive. No physi-
cian, and no licensed health professional acting under the direction of a
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physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable for failing to effectuate the
directive of the qualified patient pursuant to this subdivision.
§ 7192
(a) The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures
from a qualified patient in accordance with the provisions of this chapter
shall not, for any purpose, constitute a suicide.
(b) The making of a directive pursuant to Section 7188 shall not
restrict, inhibit, or impair in any manner the sale, procurement, or issu-
ance of any policy of life insurance, nor shall it be deemed to modify the
terms of an existing policy of life insurance. No policy of life insurance
shall be legally impaired or invalidated in any manner by the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures from an insured qualified pa-
tient, notwithstanding any term of the policy to the contrary.
(c) No physician, health facility, or other health provider, and no
health care service plan, insurer issuing disability insurance, self-insured
employee welfare benefit plan, or nonprofit hospital service plan, shall
require any person to execute a directive as a condition for being insured
for, or receiving, health care services.
§ 7193
Nothing in this chapter shall impair or supersede any legal right or
legal responsibility which any person may have to effect the withholding
or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner. In
such respect the provisions of this chapter are cumulative.
§ 7194
Any person who willfully conceals, cancels, defaces, obliterates, or
damages the directive of another without such declarant's consent shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person who, except where justified or
excused by law, falsifies or forges the directive of another, or willfully
conceals or withholds personal knowledge of a revocation as provided in
Section 7189, with the intent to cause a withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures contrary to the wishes of the declarant, and
thereby, because of any such act, directly causes life-sustaining proce-
dures to be withheld or withdrawn and death to thereby be hastened,
shall be subject to prosecution for unlawful homicide as provided in
Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 187) of Title 8 of Part 1 of the
Penal Code.
§ 7195
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to condone, authorize, or
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approve mercy killing, or to permit any affirmative or deliberate act or
omission to end life other than to permit the natural process of dying as
provided in this chapter.
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APPENDIX B: NORTH CAROLINA NATURAL DEATH ACT
2 3 7
§ 90-320
(a) The General Assembly recognizes as a matter of public policy
that an individual's rights include the right to a peaceful and natural
death and that a patient or his representative has the fundamental right
to control the decisions relating to the rendering of his own medical care,
including the decision to have extraordinary means withheld or with-
drawn in instances of a terminal condition. This Article is to establish an
optional and nonexclusive procedure by which a patient or his represen-
tative may exercise these rights.
(b) Nothing in this Article shall be construed to authorize any af-
firmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the
natural process of dying. Nothing in this Article shall impair or super-
sede any legal right or legal responsibility which any person may have to
effect the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures in any
lawful manner. In such respect the provisions of this Article are
cumulative.
§ 90-321
(a) As used in this Article the term:
(1) "Declarant" means a person who has signed a declaration
in accordance with subsection (c);
(2) "Extraordinary means" is defined as any medical proce-
dure or intervention which in the judgment of the attend-
ing physician would serve only to postpone artificially the
moment of death by sustaining, restoring, or supplanting a
vital function;
(3) "Physician" means any person licensed to practice
medicine under Article 1 of Chapter 90 of the laws of the
State of North Carolina.
(b) If a person has declared, in accordance with subsection (c) be-
low, a desire that his life not be prolonged by extraordinary means; and
the declaration has not been revoked in accordance with subsection (e);
and
(1) It is determined by the attending physician that the de-
clarant's present condition is
a. Terminal; and
b. Incurable; and
(2) There is confirmation of the declarant's present condition
237. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to 90-322 (1981 & Supp. 1983).
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as set out above in subdivision (b)(1) by a physician other
than the attending physician;
then extraordinary means may be withheld or discontinued upon the di-
rection and under the supervision of the attending physician.
(c) The attending physician may rely upon a signed, witnessed,
dated and proved declaration:
(1) Which expresses a desire of the declarant that no ex-
traordinary means be used to prolong his life if his condi-
tion is determined to be terminal and incurable; and
(2) Which states that the declarant is aware that the declara-
tion authorizes a physician to withhold or discontinue the
extraordinary means; and
(3) Which has been signed by the declarant in the presence of
two witnesses who believe the declarant to be of sound
mind and who state that they (i) are not related within the
third degree to the declarant or to the declarant's spouse,
(ii) do not know or have a reasonable expectation that
they would be entitled to any portion of the estate of the
declarant upon his death under any will of the declarant
or codicil thereto then existing or under the Intestate Suc-
cession Act as it then provides, (iii) are not the attending
physician, or an employee of the attending physician, or
an employee of a health facility in which the declarant is a
patient, or an employee of a nursing home or any group-
care home in which the declarant resides, and (iv) do not
have a claim against any portion of the estate of the de-
clarant at the time of the declaration; and
(4) Which has been proved before a clerk or assistant clerk of
superior court, or a notary public who certifies substan-
tially as set out in subsection (d) below.
(d) The following form is specifically determined to meet the re-
quirements above:
"Declaration Of A Desire For A Natural Death"
"I, __ being of sound mind, desire that my life not be pro-
longed by extraordinary means if my condition is determined to be termi-
nal and incurable. I am aware and understand that this writing
authorizes a physician to withhold or discontinue extraordinary means.
"This the - day of
Signature
"I hereby state that the declarant, , being of sound mind
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signed the above declaration in my presence and that I am not related to
the declarant by blood or marriage and that I do not know or have a
reasonable expectation that I would be entitled to any portion of the es-
tate of the declarant under any existing will or codicil of the declarant or
as an heir under the Intestate Succession Act if the declarant died on this
date without a will. I also state that I am not the declarant's attending
physician or an employee of the declarant's attending physician, or an
employee of a health facility in which the declarant is a patient or an
employee of a nursing home or any group-care home where the declarant




The clerk or assistant clerk, or a notary public may, upon proper
proof, certify the declaration as follows:
"Certificate"
"I, ., Clerk (Assistant Clerk) of Superior Court or
Notary Public (circle one as appropriate) for -County
hereby certify that ___, the declarant, appeared before me
and swore to me and to the witnesses in my presence that this instrument
is his Declaration Of A Desire For A Natural Death, and that he had
willingly and voluntarily made and executed it as his free act and deed
for the purposes expressed in it.
"I further certify that and
witnesses, appeared before me and swore that they witnessed
declarant, sign the attached declaration, believing
him to be of sound mind; and also swore that at the time they witnessed
the declaration (i) they were not related within the third degree to the
declarant or to the declarant's spouse, and (ii) they did not know or have
a reasonable expectation that they would be entitled to any portion of the
estate of the declarant upon the declarant's death under any will of the
declarant or codicil thereto then existing or under the Intestate Succes-
sion Act as it provides at that time, and (iii) they were not a physician
attending the declarant or any employee of an attending physician or an
employee of a health facility in which the declarant was a patient or an
employee of a nursing home or any group-care home in which the declar-
ant resided, and (iv) they did not have a claim against the declarant. I
further certify that I am satisfied as to the genuineness and due execution
of the declaration.
"This the day of
Clerk (Assistant Clerk) of Superior Court or
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Notary Public (circle one as appropriate) for
the County of "_
The above declaration may be proved by the clerk or the assistant
clerk, or a notary public in the following manner:
(1) Upon the testimony of the two witnesses; or
(2) If the testimony of only one witness is available, then
a. Upon the testimony of such witness, and
b. Upon proof of the handwriting of the witness who is
dead or whose testimony is otherwise unavailable, and
c. Upon proof of the handwriting of the declarant, un-
less he signed by his mark; or upon proof of such
other circumstances as will satisfy the clerk or assis-
tant clerk of the superior court, or a notary public as
to the genuineness and due execution of the
declaration.
(3) If the testimony of none of the witnesses is available, such
declaration may be proved by the clerk or assistant clerk,
or a notary public
a. Upon proof of the handwriting of the two witnesses
whose testimony is unavailable, and
b. Upon compliance with paragraph c of subdivision (2)
above.
Due execution may be established, where the evidence required
above is unavoidably lacking or inadequate, by testimony of other com-
petent witnesses as to the requisite facts.
The testimony of a witness is unavailable within the meaning of this
subsection when the witness is dead, out of the State, not to be found
within the State, insane or otherwise incompetent, physically unable to
testify or refuses to testify.
If the testimony of one or both of the witnesses is not available the
clerk or the assistant clerk, or a notary public or superior court may,
upon proper proof, certify the declaration as follows:
"Certificate"
"I ._,Clerk (Assistant Clerk) of Court of the Supe-
rior Court or Notary Public (circle one as appropriate) of
County hereby certify that based upon the evidence
before me I am satisfied as to the genuineness and due execution of the
attached declaration by , declarant, and that the de-
clarant's signature was witnessed by . and
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, who at the time of the declaration met the qualifica-
tions of G.S. 90-321(c)(3).
"This the - day of
Clerk (Assistant Clerk) of Superior Court or
Notary Public (circle one as appropriate) for
County."
(e) The above declaration may be revoked by the declarant, in any
manner by which he is able to communicate his intent to revoke, without
regard to his mental or physical condition. Such revocation shall become
effective only upon communication to the attending physician by the de-
clarant or by an individual acting on behalf of the declarant.
(f) The execution and consummation of declarations made in ac-
cordance with subsection (c) shall not constitute suicide for any purpose.
(g) No person shall be required to sign a declaration in accordance
with subsection (c) as a condition for becoming insured under any insur-
ance contract or for receiving any medical treatment.
(h) The withholding or discontinuance of extraordinary means in
accordance with this section shall not be considered the cause of death
for any civil or criminal purposes nor shall it be considered unprofes-
sional conduct. Any person, institution or facility against whom crimi-
nal or civil liability is asserted because of conduct in compliance with this
section may interpose this section as a defense.
(i) Any certificate in the form provided by this section prior to
July 1, 1979 shall continue to be valid.
§ 90-322
(a) If a person is comatose and there is no reasonable possibility
that he will return to a cognitive sapient state or is mentally incapaci-
tated, and:
(1) It is determined by the attending physician that the per-




(2) There is confirmation of the person's present condition as
set out above in this subsection, in writing by a physician
other than the attending physician; and
(3) A vital function of the person could be restored by ex-
traordinary means or a vital function of the person if be-
ing sustained by extraordinary means;
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then, extraordinary means may be withheld or discontinued in accord-
ance with subsection (b).
(b) If a person's condition has been determined to meet the condi-
tions set forth in subsection (a) and no instrument has been executed as
provided in G.S. 90-321 the extraordinary means to prolong life may be
withheld or discontinued upon the direction and under the supervision of
the attending physician with the concurrence (i) of the person's spouse,
or (ii) of a guardian of the person, or (iii) of a majority of the relatives of
the first degree, in that order. If none of the above is available then at the
discretion of the attending physician the extraordinary means may be
withheld or discontinued upon the direction and under the supervision of
the attending physician.
(c) Repealed by Session Laws 1979 c. 715 s. 2.
(d) The withholding or discontinuance of such extraordinary
means shall not be considered the cause of death for any civil or criminal
purpose nor shall it be considered unprofessional conduct. Any person,
institution or facility against whom criminal or civil liability is asserted
because of conduct in compliance with this section may interpose this
section as a defense.
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